The Economist - USA (2020-07-25)

20 Asia The EconomistJuly 25th 2020

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Banyan South China scene

C

hina hasbeen trying to turn the

South China Sea, which is bigger than

the Mediterranean, into a Chinese lake

for the better part of a decade. In the

Spratly archipelago, which is claimed

wholly or in part by Brunei, China, Ma-

laysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Viet-

nam, it has built 13 square kilometres of

artificial islands atop specks of reef and

rock. The constructions bristle with

missiles and bomber-sized bunkers.

Coastguard vessels and even a “maritime

militia” of fishing boats also help project

power far from China’s shores.

Their business is intimidation, as-

serting the right to fisheries and oil- and

gasfields within waters claimed by other

countries. Since late last year, their activ-

ities have multiplied. Chinese boats

protected by the coastguard have been

fishing in Indonesian waters. Chinese

vessels have rammed and sunk Philip-

pine and Vietnamese fishing boats and

harassed a rig drilling in Malaysian

waters. In April China further formalised

its territorial claims by establishing two

administrative districts to govern them.

Earlier this month America pushed

back in a new way. Its secretary of state,

Mike Pompeo, declared that China’s

claims to offshore resources in the South

China Sea were “completely unlawful, as

is its campaign of bullying.” Much like

the abrupt demand this week that China

immediately close its consulate in Hous-

ton, the statement constituted a new

salvo in America’s ever-expanding hos-

tilities with China.

Mr Pompeo’s harangue came on the

fourth anniversary of a ruling by an

international tribunal at The Hague in a

case brought against China by the Philip-

pines. That ruling demolished China’s

claims to maritime resources within the

sea as going far beyond rights granted by

the unConvention on the Law of the Sea

(unclos). China is a signatory of unclos

(America is not), but it angrily dismissed

the ruling as “a piece of paper”. Yet the

Philippines also set it aside: President

Rodrigo Duterte had just come to power

and was eager for Chinese investment.

America has always rejected China’s

expansive claims in the sea, but Mr Pom-

peo is far more emphatic than the admin-

istration of Barack Obama was at the time

of the ruling. Not one of the specks China

occupies in the Spratlys, he reiterated,

counts as a proper island, which would

come with a 200-nautical-mile (370km)

“exclusive economic zone”. Nor does

China have rights around Scarborough

Shoal, where its activity, the tribunal

ruled, infringed on Philippine rights. Mr

Pompeo dismissed China’s claims around

Vanguard Bank off Vietnam, Luconia

Shoals off Borneo and Natuna Besar, which

is part of Indonesia. And he rubbished its

claim to James Shoal, off the Malaysian

coast. China cites it as its “southernmost

territory”—though over 1,500km from

China proper and 20m below the surface.

Until now, America’s priority in the

South China Sea has been to ensure free

passage for shipping. The Trump admin-

istration has sharply increased “freedom

of navigation” operations, in which

American warships sail close to Chinese

outposts without asking for permission.

It recently deployed two aircraft carriers

to the sea at the same time. Now it is

backing other claimants resisting what

its assistant secretary of state for the

region, David Stilwell, calls China’s

“gangster tactics”.

The other claimants welcome the

American move, which has bipartisan

support in Washington. Mr Duterte’s

love-in with China appears over, and

hawks alarmed at Chinese behaviour are

running Philippine foreign policy again.

Vietnam may take its own case against

China to The Hague. As for a promised

code of conduct in the South China Sea

between China and the Association of

South-East Asian Nations (asean), of

which the other claimants bar Taiwan are

all members, agreeing on a text looks

daunting, say Hoang Thi Ha and Ian

Storey of the iseas-Yusof Ishak Institute

in Singapore. China will never accept a

code that affirms unclosprovisions, as

aseanmembers want; nor will asean

members give in to China’s demands, in

effect, to be able to veto military exer-

cises with outside parties.

But having America at your back is a

mixed blessing. It could help establish

what Bill Hayton of Chatham House, a

think-tank in London, calls a “picket

line” emboldening aseanmembers to

work together to uphold unclos. Yet, Ms

Ha and Mr Storey point out, China is

more likely to double down than retreat.

And the last place the minnows want to

be is in the middle of a clash between the

South China Sea’s two big fish.

America is churning waters claimed by China

tons of cargo during a four-day voyage

from China to Japan. Earlier this year it de-

ployed a remotely-navigated tugboat in To-

kyo Bay. Aboard some of mol’s ships the

helmsmen gaze at horizons with augment-

ed reality overlays that show the depths of

the surrounding seas and the position of

ships imperceptible to the naked eye. Algo-

rithms flag potential collisions. As well as

relieving labour shortages, the industry

sees self-steering ships as a way to reduce

accidents at sea, some 70% of which are

caused by human error. “A computer

doesn’t become tired and make mistakes,”

says Koyama Tomoyuki of nyk.

Driverless ships, however, pose particu-

lar challenges. As Mr Koyama puts it, “We

don’t have roads at sea. You can go any di-

rection.” The oceans are filled with ships of

varying sizes, from one-man sailboats to

hulking tankers. The elements can discom-

bobulate. During its containership trial,

nykfound that its computer programme

was too sensitive to the fluctuations of

rough seas. Oceans also come with unex-

pected obstacles far more troublesome

than a pothole. “Whales, for example,” says

Kawagoe Yoshikazu of mol.

Communications and security present

further difficulties. The speed of data

transfer to and from ships lags about 15

years behind those on land, reckons Mr

Kawagoe. Fully crewless ships would also

present opportunities for cyber-pirates

(and the ordinary sort, too, presumably).

nyk believes it will be cheaper to keep

some crew members aboard than to build

up ships’ digital defences. Human psychol-

ogy may also be a barrier to fully auto-

nomous vessels: if driverless cars seem

spooky, Mr Kuwahara notes, imagine being

at sea aboard a captain-less cruise ship. 7