The EconomistAugust 1st 2020 Middle East & Africa 392
“W
e were bornhere, wegrew up
here,butnowwelivelikebeggars,”
fumesTsigeBule,gazingfroma rain-splat-
teredporchtowardsthegreyand unfin-
ished apartment block that looms over
what remainsof her family’sfarmland.
SeveralyearsagotheEthiopianauthorities
confiscatedalmostallofittobuildpublic
housingforresidentsofAddisAbaba,the
capital.Inthepastdecadetheexpanding
cityhasinchedeverclosertoTsige’svillage.
Shesoldhercowsandbeganbuyingjerry
cansbecausewaterfromthenearbyriver
hadbecometoxic.Hersonsdroppedoutof
school to work as labourers on nearby
buildingsites.A lifeofmodestcomforttee-
teredtowarddestitution.
Thereisa deepwellofangerinthesub-
urbsandcountrysidearoundtheEthiopian
capital.InJulyriotstookplacenearTsige’s
homeaftertheassassinationofHachalu
Hundessa,a popularmusicianandactivist
fromtheOromoethnicgroup.Newhous-
ingestateswerepeltedwithstones,cars
and petrol stations were set alight. Towns
across the vast region of Oromia, which
surrounds Addis Ababa, were similarly rav-
aged. Much of central Shashamene, a
booming entrepot some 200km south, was
burned to the ground. There were wide-
spread attacks on minorities, notably Am-
haras, the largest ethnic group after the
Oromo. Hotels, businesses and homes
were destroyed or damaged. By one count
239 people were killed, some murdered by
mobs, others by security forces.
The threads that connect the carnage in
Oromia with the plight of Tsige’s family are
real, even if hard to see. In recent years
towns and cities in southern Ethiopia, es-
pecially in Oromia, have been flashpointsforpoliticalandethnicturmoil.Thelatest
bout was triggered by national politics:
many Oromos saw Hachalu’s murder as an
attack on the Oromo opposition move-
ment. Much of their anger is also stoked by
a fear that Abiy Ahmed, the prime minister,
has reneged on promises he made in 2018
to end both authoritarian rule and the al-
leged marginalisation of Oromos. But a
closer look at the pattern of violence in cer-
tain places suggests that local factors such
as who owns land and businesses may also
have played a big part.
Many southern towns began as imperial
garrisons after the conquests of Emperor
Menelik ii, an Amhara, in the late 19th cen-
tury. Establishing cities sometimes in-
volved the eviction of those already on theland, including the Oromo clans who lived
on ground that was taken for Addis Ababa.
As towns expanded they attracted settlers
from Ethiopia’s northern highlands, who
spoke Amharic and dominated urban com-
merce and the state bureaucracy. Amharic-
speakers are still perceived to control
much of the urban economy. “If you take 50
hotels in the city, only three are owned by
Oromos,” alleges the owner of a juice bar in
Adama, the second-largest city in Oromia.
Old tensions are exacerbated by two fac-
tors in modern Ethiopian politics. The first
is the 1995 constitution, which carved up
territory along ethnic lines. In doing so it
introduced the notion of ethnic ownership
of cities and towns. This is particularly pro-
nounced in the case of Addis Ababa, in
which the constitution granted Oromia a
“special interest”. Oromo nationalists
claim the city is part of their historic
“homeland” and demand a final say over its
governance. But similar conflicts fester
elsewhere, sometimes turning violent, as
in the eastern city of Harar, where a minor-
ity of ethnic Harari enjoyed political privi-
leges at the expense of much larger Oromo
and Amhara populations.
The system also hardened perceptions
of non-indigenous folk as alien settlers. In
Shashamene mobs went from door to door
checking identity cards, which record eth-
nicity, before burning property belonging
to Christians and non-Oromos. “They have
a plan to dominate the economy of this
town,” frets a non-Oromo. “At the core this
is about the concentration of economic
power and opportunity in urban areas,”
says Eshetayehu Kinfu of Hawassa Univer-
sity near Shashamene.
The second factor is land. In Ethiopia,
all land is owned by the state. Although the
constitution guarantees free land to farm-
ers, in practice farmers and poor folk in cit-
ies have few legal protections from evic-
tion, says Logan Cochrane, also of Hawassa
University. For urban officials, leasing and
administering high-value land is a source
of revenue, rents and patronage. So many
grab lots of it, adding to the ranks of the
landless and jobless.
“Our fathers lost their land, so we have
nothing to inherit,” says Tsige’s son Bete-
mariam. An added sore is that public hous-
ing built on land that belonged to Oromo
farmers was typically given to more
prosperous city-dwellers. “It’s not fair,”
says Beshadu Degife, who lives down the
lane. “This land is ours but now it’s people
from other places who are enjoying it.”
The growing perception is that towns
with mixed populations are strongholds of
Abiy’s Prosperity Party, which seeks to have
no ethnic slant. This perception may fur-
ther aggravate tensions. As Ethiopia pre-
pares for delayed elections some time next
year, towns will be places to watch—and
worry about. 7ADDISABABAANDSHASHAMENE
HowlanddisputesfuelethnicconflictinEthiopiaEthiopiaUrbanbrawl
After the identity checksample to state-owned enterprises such as
Eskom, the indebted electricity utility.
They are open to a self-imposed “debt ceil-
ing” (public borrowing is projected to hit
87% of gdp in 2024 before declining). But
little of this is new. In June Mr Mboweni
gave a statement to parliament with simi-
lar commitments.
South Africa’s problem is not a lack of
ideas. It is politics. Although he has said he
supports Mr Mboweni, President Cyril Ra-
maphosa has done little to show it. He has
often made the job of his finance minister
harder, for instance by promising that
there would be no “mass retrenchment” ofpublic employees, and by dithering over
state enterprises. Corruption remains rife.
Credit-rating agencies doubt that Mr Mbo-
weni will meet his targets. Few believe that
Mr Ramaphosa will face down trade unions
or his party ahead of its National General
Council and local elections in 2021.
So this may not be the last time South
Africa turns to the fund. The next bail-out
would come with tough conditions, which
would infuriate the anc. But the party
ought to appreciate what Mr Mbeki and Mr
Manuel understood: that the way to protect
your economic sovereignty is to avoid the
need for the imfin the first place. 7