The EconomistAugust 1st 2020 Leaders 91A
utocrats aroundthe world have a lot to learn from Alex-
ander Lukashenko, the president of Belarus, a former Soviet
republic of 10m people between Poland and Russia. He was ad-
mired by the late Venezuelan president, Hugo Chávez, is cham-
pioned by Hungary’s Viktor Orban and cordially received by Chi-
na’s Xi Jinping. Vladimir Putin has copied some of his electoral
dirty tricks. Mr Lukashenko has been in office longer than any of
them, thanks to a mixture of populism, socialism, repression,
Russian cash and European toleration.
But as Belarus heads into an election on August 9th, Mr Lu-
kashenko faces one of the trickiest moments in his 26-year rule.The result is not in doubt—assuming the vote goes ahead. Bela-
rus has not had a free or fair election since 1994, when the former
collective-farm boss swept to power pledging to restore stability
three years after the Soviet Union collapsed. With two of his
challengers in jail and a third in exile, opinion polls banned, in-
dependent observers barred and riot police poised to crush prot-
ests, Mr Lukashenko is certain to declare himself the winner,
with a fat majority. What is much less certain this time is wheth-
er Belarusians will accept the result. For the West, the election
entails both risks and opportunities. Reducing the first and max-
imising the second will require principles and nerve.The next revolution?
A former Soviet state is on the brink of serious troubleBelarusI
n a bookofessayscalled“TheNextGreatWar?”,whichexam-
ines Sino-American relations through the lens of the first
world war, Richard Rosecrance warns of “the tyranny of small
things”, the points of friction and misunderstanding between ri-
val powers that, without leadership to manage them, can lead to
conflict. China and America today are not about to take up arms,
but small things are rapidly accumulating. The two distrust each
other more now than at any point since Richard Nixon went to
China almost 50 years ago. As a presidential election draws near,
the potential for dangerous miscalculation is growing.
On July 27th America’s consulate in Chengdu closed on orders
from Beijing. It was in retaliation for the Trump administration’s
order, a week earlier, to close China’s consulate in Houston, the
first such moves since the normalisation of rela-
tions in 1979. This capped a month in which
America sanctioned a sitting member of China’s
Politburo, also a first, over the internment of Ui-
ghurs in Xinjiang; declared China’s expansive
claims in the South China Sea illegal; ceased to
recognise Hong Kong as distinct from mainland
China; and claimed a victory in its campaign
against Huawei, when Britain announced that it
would bar the telecoms-equipment giant from its 5gnetworks.
For the hawks who surround President Donald Trump, this is
overdue. In a series of four speeches that evoked the cold war,
they laid out their case for abandoning “blind engagement” with
China for a more confrontational relationship. On June 26th
Robert O’Brien, the national security adviser, said that Xi Jin-
ping, China’s president, “sees himself as Josef Stalin’s succes-
sor”. On July 7th Christopher Wray, the fbidirector, claimed that
China was seeking to become “the world’s only superpower by
any means necessary”, and warned of its extensive efforts to spy
on, influence and co-opt Americans. On July 17th William Barr,
the attorney-general, charged that Hollywood studios and Amer-
ica’s tech giants had become “pawns of Chinese influence”. AndonJuly23rdMikePompeo,thesecretaryofstate,declared that Mr
Xi was engaged in a decades-long battle for global supremacy,
and that America and other democracies must fight back.
A new, realistic strategy for standing up to China would be
welcome. The atrocities in Xinjiang and the demolition of the
rule of law in Hong Kong demand a tougher response than the
world has mustered thus far. China’s territorial ambitions in its
near seas are worrying. Its economic leverage over trade partners
and companies sets it apart as an adversary from its communist
predecessor, the Soviet Union. In calling attention to the com-
prehensive and complex threat Mr Xi’s China poses, Mr Trump’s
hawks have achieved something.
But their speeches add up to an attitude, not a strategy. They
articulate a compelling argument for imposing
pain on China, but no framework for judging
how and when to do so. They talk about working
with allies in loose, aspirational terms. They
have little to offer on larger geopolitical con-
cerns like climate change, other than to say Chi-
na cannot be trusted to keep its commitments.
Another president might formulate a grand
vision for how to engage China under such con-
ditions (see United States section). These hawks have Mr Trump.
His disregard for democratic allies and the cause of human
rights, and his personal affinity for Mr Xi, make him singularly
ill-suited to lead a contest with China over global values. He has
gripes with China, over trade and covid-19, but these are not root-
ed in principle. His eyes are on what can get him re-elected.
That sets up a combustible dynamic in the months ahead. As
the election approaches, Mr Trump could be persuaded to take
more dramatic action—say, financial sanctions on Chinese
banks in Hong Kong, or a military display of support for Taiwan.
A mishap or misunderstanding could prove perilous. It is right to
want to chart a more robust course in Sino-American relations—
but it would also be wise to beware the tyranny of small things. 7One thing after another
This is a dangerous moment for relations between America and China. Cool heads must prevailSino-American relations