The Economist - USA (2020-08-22)

38 TheEconomistAugust 22nd 2020

1

I

t was notquite Anwar Sadat speaking

before the Knesset, or King Hussein and

Yitzhak Rabin clutching hands in the Rose

Garden. That would not have been Muham-

mad bin Zayed’s style. The agreement be-

tween Israel and the United Arab Emirates

(uae), announced on August 13th, was

hashed out quietly by spies and sheikhs

and unveiled largely on Twitter. It made the

uae the first Gulf country and only the

third Arab state to open formal relations

with Israel. Yet it had all the pomp and cir-

cumstance of a tariff agreement.

Though long overshadowed by Saudi

Arabia, Prince Muhammad, the uae’s de

facto ruler (pictured in illustration), has

turned his small country of 10m people

into arguably the most influential Arab

state. It wields soft power through Dubai,

the region’s business hub, and firms like dp

World, a shipping giant. A compact but ca-

pable army provides a sharper edge. Emi-

rati money and media have backed coups

and intrigue across the Middle East.

Much of this is done quietly, allowing

the uaeto evade the scrutiny applied to

bigger powers. Savvy at playing politics in

Washington, Paris and other capitals, it po-

sitions itself as a reliable partner. “We real-

ise our size,” says one Emirati official. “We

need to be part of collective policies.” West-

erners who advise the government in Abu

Dhabi, often ex-diplomats or retired sol-

diers, slip into the first-person plural, as if

there is no daylight between their employ-

er and their native countries.

Yet the uaeis increasingly willing to go

its own way. Its priorities differ from some

of its neighbours’: more pragmatic towards

Iran and more hostile towards political Is-

lam. It broke with the Saudis in Yemen, the

Americans in Libya, and many of its part-

ners in Syria. Optimists hope it can spread

“the Dubai model”—good governance, a vi-

brant economy, an admirable emphasis on

religious tolerance—across the Middle

East. But the uae’s efforts to secure its own

interests may just as well entrench the re-

gion’s woes.

In military matters it is true that the uae

rarely acts alone. But it plays an outsized

role. The troops it sent to Yemen in 2015

were the most effective piece of a Saudi-led

coalition fighting the Houthis, a Shia rebel

group. Their departure last summer left the

Saudis little choice but to start negotiating

their own exit. Emirati drones propped up

Khalifa Haftar, the Libyan warlord who

tried last year to conquer Tripoli, until Tur-

key’s superior forces put paid to that effort.

Officials at the Pentagon admiringly call

the uae “little Sparta”. Actual Spartans

might have found its glitzy hotels a touch

frivolous. But the aphorism reflects frus-

tration with Arab states that spend billions

on Western kit yet accomplish little with it.

The Emiratis have proved more capable.

They are also less dogmatic, at least in

some areas. Most Gulf states joined the ef-

fort to unseat Bashar al-Assad in Syria. The

uaewas the first to recognise its failure. It

The United Arab Emirates

The strong, silent type

ABU DHABI AND BEIRUT

Quietly, the uaehas become a force in the Middle East and beyond

Middle East & Africa

39 Israel’snextArabfriend

40 A riteoldmessinIran

40 UnusualAfricanstamps

41 MutinyinMali

41 The oil spill off Mauritius

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