The EconomistAugust 22nd 2020 Middle East & Africa 392 reopened its embassy in Damascus in De-
cember 2018 despite concerns from allies.
Some Emiratis insist, implausibly, that the
mission focuses simply on consular cases.
Others argue that engaging Mr Assad may
make him more receptive to change. “It’s
about trying to bring Syria back to the Arab
fold,” says one official.
Such hopes are unrealistic. But the will-
ingness to court Mr Assad reflects a wider
split on how to handle his main backer:
Iran. The Saudis see Iran as an existential
threat. The Emiratis have no love for it ei-
ther. They harbour a long-running territo-
rial dispute over islands in the Gulf; West-
ern officials blame Iran for the sabotage of
oil tankers in Emirati waters last year. Yet
the uaetakes a softer line. Firms linked to
Iran and its allies do business in Dubai. Not
all of it is legitimate (see Finance section).
Once an eager backer of America’s “maxi-
mum pressure” campaign, the uaehas re-
cently tried to lower tensions.
The uae’s more assertive role roughly
coincides with the ascent of Muhammad
bin Salman, or mbs, the Saudi prince who
became heir to the throne in 2017. “mbsis
young, he’s new, and he’s busy with socio-
economic changes at home,” says a West-
ern diplomat in the Gulf. “The Emiratis felt
they needed to pick up the slack.”
In some cases the Saudis were happy to
let them. For decades the Saudis wielded
influence in Lebanon through Rafiq and
Saad Hariri, the father-and-son duo who
served as prime ministers for 16 of the past
28 years. But on their watch corruption
spread, while Hizbullah, the Iranian-
backed militia and political party, became
Lebanon’s most powerful actor.
After the Saudis briefly kidnapped Saad
in 2017 in a failed attempt to bring political
change, they washed their hands of the
country. “They gave the Lebanon file to the
Emiratis,” says a diplomat in Beirut. The
Emiratis have been content to let it lan-
guish: they have not stepped in to bail out
Lebanon’s bankrupt government.
With its factious politics, Lebanon is
unappealing territory for the uae. Underly-
ing much of its regional policy is a suspi-
cion of mass politics. The Arab uprisings of
2011, seen from Abu Dhabi, brought not
hope but chaos. The uaewants “evolution,
not revolution”, says an official. In practice
this means a preference for anti-Islamist
autocrats who pose as modernisers.
Perhaps the exemplar of this is Abdel-
Fattah al-Sisi, the Egyptian general who led
a coup, with Gulf support, against an elect-
ed Islamist government in 2013. At times he
seems to model himself on the Emirati
crown prince. Mr Sisi’s ambition to build a
gleaming new capital in the desert east of
Cairo is reminiscent of Dubai. Periodic lec-
tures to Egyptians about their work ethic or
physical fitness evoke the top-down ap-
proach to shaping society in the uae.
Thatmayworkfortheuae, whichkeeps
citizensandresidentsinlinewitha com-
fortablestandardofliving,electronicsur-
veillanceand,fortheforeigners,thethreat
ofdeportation.ButMrSisi’sfondnessfor
Gulf-stylemega-projectsseemswastefulin
a poorcountryof100mpeople;hisintoler-
ancefor politicsgrateson citizens of a
countrythat,forallitsyearsofdictator-
ship,hasarichpoliticaltradition.What
worksinDubaidoesnotnecessarilywork
elsewhere—neitherasevolution,norasan
efforttoforestallfuturerevolution. 7“N
ow thatthe ice has been broken, I
expect more Arab and Muslim coun-
tries will follow the United Arab Emirates’
lead,” said President Donald Trump on Au-
gust 13th, when the uaebecame just the
third Arab state (after Egypt and Jordan) to
establish formal ties with Israel. The move
was greeted with approval by several of the
region’s leaders, who have long had secret
dealings with the Jewish state. So who will
be next to bring them into the open?
A good bet is Oman, which congratulat-
ed Israel and the uaeon their agreement. In
the past Oman has played the role of inter-
locutor between Israel and the Arab world.
In 2018 the late Sultan Qaboos hosted Bin-
yamin Netanyahu, the first visit by an Is-
raeli prime minister to the Gulf in over twodecades (pictured). But in January a new
sultan, Haitham bin Tariq, took over. He
dismissed the foreign minister on August
18th, a day after the top diplomat spoke to
his Israeli counterpart. The move came as
part of a larger government shake-up, but
Sultan Haitham may not yet feel secure
enough to take such a bold step.
If Oman doesn’t go next, perhaps Bah-
rain will. Its cabinet praised the “historic”
Israel-uaedeal. Its prime minister has re-
portedly talked to the chief of Israel’s spy
agency. And it has hosted Israeli officials
before. American diplomats unveiled the
economic half of Mr Trump’s Middle East
peace plan in Bahrain’s capital, Manama,
last year. The tiny kingdom is close to the
uaeand, like Israel, it views Iran as a threat.
Some point to Sudan as a strong pos-
sibility. Its interim leader, Abdel Fattah al-
Burhan, met Mr Netanyahu this year in
Uganda, where they agreed to start normal-
ising ties. Lately, though, Sudan has sent
mixed messages.
On the other side of Africa, Morocco is a
decent bet too. It has played a leading role
in previous Arab peace initiatives with Is-
rael and was once a hub of Jewish life. Hun-
dreds of thousands of Israelis hail from the
north African state. Nearby Mauritania is
another contender. It had formal ties with
Israel from 1999 to 2009, but broke them off
because of war over Gaza. Still, it praised
the uae’s “good judgment”.
A long shot is Saudi Arabia. Muhammad
bin Salman, the kingdom’s crown prince
and de facto ruler, has said that formal rela-
tions could be mutually beneficial. He
seems envious of Israel’s economic and
technological might. The two countries al-
ready co-operate to counter Iran. But for-
mal ties are probably still a step too far for
the conservative kingdom. 7JERUSALEM
The Arab countries most likely to
follow the path of the uaeIsrael and the Arab worldWho’s next?
I’m betting on this country