The EconomistAugust 22nd 2020 Middle East & Africa 41M
alians are no strangers to coups
d’état. In 1991 the armed forces
stepped in after sustained protests against
Moussa Traoré, the dictator who had ruled
the west African country since 1968. (Traoré
himself had led a coup against his prede-
cessor.) In March 2012 mutinous soldiers
angry at the government’s handling of a re-
bellion in the north ousted the president,
Amadou Toumani Touré.
The latest coup, on August 18th, has fa-
miliar echoes. It comes after months of
protests. Like the events of 2012, it began
with a mutiny at a base in Kati, a garrison
town 15km (9 miles) outside the capital, Ba-
mako. Soldiers arrested the president, Ibra-
him Boubacar Keita, who in a video later
that day announced his resignation from
behind a face mask. “Do I really have a
choice?” he asked. “Because I do not wish
blood to be shed.” A day later five members
of the new junta announced on television
that they want “a civil political transition”.
For all the similarities, the context is
different from eight or 29 or 52 years ago. In
the aftermath of the coup in 2012 Islamists
took advantage of the political vacuum to
launch attacks throughout the northern
two-thirds of the country, prompting
France to send in troops. Following its in-
tervention, France, the African Union (au)
and ecowas, the regional bloc, backed a un
mission, called minusma, to keep the
peace while elections were held and a new
political settlement reached.
Mr Keita won presidential elections in
2013 and 2018. An agreement between the
government and northern rebel groups
was ostensibly reached in Algiers in 2015,
the latest of several such deals since the
early 1990s. But, like the others, it has failed
to quell the discontent.
An inept, out-of-touch government led
by a southern elite has done little to stop
escalating jihadist violence—and even less
to deal with its root causes. In the first half
of 2020 more than 1,800 people were killed
in fights involving jihadists and ethnic mi-
litias, almost as many as were killed in 2019
(see map). The presence of Western forces,
15,000 un peacekeepers and an eu-led
training mission has not stopped the
bloodshed. Malian efforts to arm local mi-
litias have made matters worse.
Anger at the government’s handling of
the conflict has risen steadily. Soldiers, as
well as their wives and widows, have lam-
basted the officials in charge of operations.Allegations that those in or close to power
are taking advantage of a corrupt war econ-
omy have increased. Outsiders have tended
to push military solutions to political pro-
blems. The folly of that approach has been
clear in recent months. After dodgy legisla-
tive elections held in March and April, dur-
ing which time an opposition politician
was kidnapped, protesters took to the
streets. In July the security forces killed at
least 11 people.
It is unclear whether there was any co-
ordination between the officers behind the
coup and the groups leading the protests. A
leader of the opposition m5-rfp movement
told the bbcthat the coup was a “relief”.The junta says it wants fresh elections.
Mahmoud Dicko, an influential imam,
could act as a kingmaker.
Outside Mali condemnation of the coup
has been swift. Moussa Faki Mahamat,
chair of the au’s secretariat, said he “rejects
any attempt at the unconstitutional
change of government in Mali”. ecowas,
which had been trying to cajole Mr Keita
into a deal with the protest movement, crit-
icised the “putschists”, closed neighbour-
ing borders with Mali and promised sanc-
tions against the leaders of the coup.
ecowasstates do not want Malians giv-
ing their own people any ideas, especially
with presidential elections due later this
year in Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast,
which have both seen recent protests.
(Ghana is also scheduled to go to the polls.)
The more coups go unpunished, the more
likely they are in future.
Neighbouring countries also share
Western concerns about what the coup
means for jihadist violence in the Sahel. As
the events of 2012 suggest, Islamists are op-
portunistic and will take advantage of po-
litical paralysis. On August 19th France and
Niger called an emergency meeting of the
unSecurity Council.
Condemnation of the coup may not,
however, lead to the reinstallation of Mr
Keita. If he were to be propped up, he could
collapse again. Whatever the approach, it
will need to amount to more than deals
among incompetent elites. That may be
what the jihadists want. But it is not what
Malians deserve. 7JOHANNESBURG
Soldiers have toppled the president.
Now what?Mutiny in MaliA coup that was
coming
250 kmBamakoKatiTimbuktu
NIGERNIGERIAMALIALGERIA
MAURITANIAGUINEAGHANABENIN
IVORYCOAST TOGOBURKINA FASOViolent incident
involving Jihadist
group, 2020*SahelSecurity in the Sahel, permanent bases
Member country†Sources: ACLED; Africa Centre
for Strategic Studies*To Aug 1st
†Includes ChadOperation Barkhane (France)G5 Sahel ( joint force)
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