The Economist - USA (2020-08-22)

The EconomistAugust 22nd 2020 International 51

2 in the region are entangled. His price for
halting General Haftar was the Libyan gov-
ernment’s assent to a maritime deal bol-
stering Turkey’s claims. The accord
mapped out Libyan and Turkish continen-
tal shelves and eezs spanning the Mediter-
ranean. They overlapped with those of Cy-
prus and Greece—ignoring the existence of
Crete and Rhodes—and pointedly cut
across the path of the proposed pipeline.
The deal prompted howls of complaint in
Greece. So on August 6th Greece and Egypt,
which supports General Haftar and chafes
at Turkey’s support for Islamist factions in
the Middle East, signed their own maritime
accord. That contributed to Mr Erdogan’s
decision to send in the Oruc Reisand so to
the latest flare-up.
Libya is only one of several Franco-
Turkish flashpoints. Last year Mr Macron
denounced a Turkish offensive in northern
Syria which disrupted American, British
and French support for Kurdish fighters
battling Islamic State. “This re-emergence
of authoritarian powers, essentially Tur-
key and Russia, which are the two main
players in our neighbourhood policy...
creates a kind of turmoil,” he declared.
France also responded to Turkish incur-
sions into Cypriot waters by expanding its
naval presence in Cyprus and conducting
joint military exercises in the area with
Greece, Cyprus and Italy (see diagram).

A growing problem

Turkey’s relations with other eastern Medi-

terranean countries have also soured. A de-

cade ago Israel and Turkey were close mil-

itary partners, but that ended after Israeli

commandos attacked Turkish civilian

ships trying to break a blockade of Gaza in

2010. “Greece became very important in
      providing a substitute, especially in terms
      of training space,” says Oded Eran, a former
      Israeli diplomat at the Institute for Nation-
      al Security Studies in Tel Aviv. Yossi Cohen,
      Israel’s spy chief, is reported to have told
      his Saudi, Emirati and Egyptian counter-
      parts last year that Turkey posed a greater
      threat than Iran.
      He would have found a sympathetic au-
      dience, for Turkey is at loggerheads with
      both Egypt and the uae. A kaleidoscope of
      grievances against Turkey has helped to
      meld a trio of European states (Greece, Cy-
      prus and France), a pair of Arab ones (Egypt
      and the uae) and Israel into a loose but for-
      midable geopolitical front. “Turkey basi-
      cally has had its back against the wall for
      the last four or five years,” says Nathalie
      Tocci of the Italian Institute of Internation-
      al Affairs, who advises Josep Borrell, the
      eu’s foreign-policy chief. “What Turkey
      managed to do in the last year is get back
      into the game through Libya,” she says.
      When Greece and Turkey came close to
      war in 1996, America helped calm the crisis.
      It remains a big player in the region and has

its own gripes about Turkey. After Mr Erdo-

gan bought Russia’s s-400 air-defence sys-

tem against natoobjections, the Trump

administration kicked Turkey out of the

programme for buying f-35 warplanes.

In December America lifted an arms

embargo on Cyprus, part of a batch of mea-

sures it said would boost energy security in

Cyprus and Europe; that Cypriot interests

align with ExxonMobil’s may have helped.

Last month America said it would fund

military training for the island for the first

time and sent an aircraft-carrier to exercise

with Greece off Crete, prompting the Oruc

Reisto scurry back to harbour. This week a

brand-new American helicopter carrier an-

chored in Souda Bay, a Greek base on Crete.

Yet American policy is erratic. Its ap-

proach to Libya has see-sawed. Donald

Trump is unlikely to pay much attention to

the intricacies of maritime boundaries as

America’s presidential election looms.

That makes the eu, which Cyprus joined in

2004, a vital actor. The club lacks America’s

armadas. But it has other levers at its dispo-

sal. It has already sanctioned Turkey for

“unauthorised drilling activities”. Mr Mac-

ron is keen to go further.

The problem is that the eu, which

makes foreign-policy decisions by consen-

sus, is itself divided. Italy and Spain want

to smooth things over with Turkey. Ger-

many was irked by Greece’s decision to

tweak Turkey’s nose by signing the mari-

time pact with Egypt just a day before talks

between Greece and Turkey—mediated by

Germany—were to take place.

Others are irritated by France, particu-

larly its support for General Haftar in Libya.

“There is little love for Turkey in Western

capitals these days, but the French way of

confronting Erdogan is not popular either,”

writes Emile Hokayem of the International

Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

On August 19th European leaders ex-

pressed “full solidarity” with Greece and

Cyprus and agreed to discuss the issue fur-

ther in September, promising that “all op-

tions will be on the table”. But Ms Tocci

concludes that “ultimately Europeans are

not going to do anything significant.” That

infuriates France, which believes someone

should stand up to Turkey’s challenges to

the eu’s maritime borders. “Defence is not

a spectator sport,” comments François

Heisbourg of the Foundation for Strategic

Research, referring to German policy.

Neither Greece nor Turkey can afford

these rising tensions in the Mediterranean.

Both depend on their coastlines for billions

of dollars from tourism. The few foreigners

considering a trip to a Turkish or Greek re-

sort later this year may be willing to risk co-

vid-19, but not war. But neither country can

back down easily. Mr Mitsotakis, Greece’s

centre-right prime minister, is held hos-

tage by a nationalist faction in his New De-

mocracy party with enough mps to topple

his government. Mr Erdogan may be a divi-

sive figure, but his Mediterranean policy

wins bipartisan backing at home, notes Si-

nan Ülgen, a former Turkish diplomat who

chairs edam, a think-tank in Istanbul.

“This is viewed as an attack on Turkey’s na-

tional sovereignty.”

On August 16th Turkey’s foreign minis-

try vowed to press ahead with exploration:

“No alliance of malice will manage to pre-

vent this. Those who think otherwise have

not taken their lessons from history.” On

August 18th another Turkish vessel, the Ya -

vuz, a drillship, headed for Cypriot waters

to start four weeks of seismic surveys. A

third vessel, the Barbaros, has been in the

area since late July. If Turkish ships were to

enter Crete’s potentially oil-rich waters,

which under the Turkey-Libya accord is as-

signed to Libya, then “all bets are off,”

warns Mr Tanchum. That is unlikely for the

moment. But in the past, says Selim Kuner-

alp, a former Turkish ambassador to the

eu, “there was the army and the president

who acted as a brake. But now there is no

brake and a guy [Mr Erdogan] who’s com-

Dr Erdogan makes a house call in Libya pletely unpredictable.” 7

Greek chorus

Source: The Economist

East Mediterranean Gas

Forum members

Against Turkey

in Libyan conflict

Joint military exercises

in east Mediterranean

Palestine

Jordan

UAE

Cyprus Egypt

Greece

Italy

Israel

France