The Economist - USA (2020-08-29)

The EconomistAugust 29th 2020 BriefingBelarus and Russia 15

2

1

Mr Navalny’s chief of staff, put it on Face-

book, “Lukashenko with a rifle or Putin

with his poison—which one of them is

more crazy?...What is happening in Belarus

today provides some clues about what

awaits Russia in the very near future.” On

the streets of Khabarovsk the protesters

have started shouting their support for the

Belarusian uprising.

Under the helicopter

The Belarusians, for their part, are experi-

encing a true awakening. On August 23rd,

in the biggest protest to date, hundreds of

thousands came to Independence Square

in Minsk, covering it with the red and

white of the flag used by the short-lived

Belarusian republic of 1918-19. The authori-

ties, which have dialled back the extreme

violence of their response to the first prot-

ests, sent in police patrols and played patri-

otic songs from the second world war over

a rooftop tannoy system. The protesters re-

sponded by howling, beating drums and

chanting, shaking their heads in seeming

disbelief at what they were doing. The at-

mosphere had an odd resemblance to that

of an early Pride parade: something re-

pressed was coming out, surprised and de-

lighted to recognise itself.

The awakening is decentralised, its lack

of established leaders a testament to the

years Mr Lukashenko has spent steamroll-

ering all opposition. Svetlana Tikhanov-

skaya, the candidate who the protesters be-

lieve would have won the election handily

if the ballots had been fairly counted, was a

complete unknown when the campaign

started. She stood because her husband

Sergei, a popular vlogger who had an-

nounced his intention to run for president

and thereby crush Mr Lukashenko, had

been jailed as a result.

“There has never been a plan other than

reminding people of their own dignity,”

says Maria Kolesnikova, one of the two oth-

er women who helped lead Ms Tikhanov-

skaya’s campaign and now the only one of

the three still in the country. Ms Tikhanov-

skaya fled for Lithuania on August 11th after

the government effectively took her hos-

tage and coerced her into reading out a con-

demnation of the protests.

Mr Lukashenko seems in shock. The

four previous elections he has staged since

becoming president in 1994 (he abolished

his country’s term limits 16 years ago) all

provided him with between 75% and 85%

of the vote. This one, rigged just as well if

not better, seemed sure to see the streak

continue. But when his 80% of the counted

vote was duly announced the people sim-

ply refused to believe it. On August 23rd he

flew over the protests in a helicopter with

his 15-year-old son, railing at the streets be-

low. On landing he emerged toting a semi-

automatic rifle, oddly lacking a magazine,

to cheer the riot police guarding his resi-

dence in their armoured personnel carri-

ers: “Thank you. You are gorgeous. We will

sort them out.” The images were meant to

demonstrate his resolve to the armed

forces. Their brittle edge of craziness may

have undercut the intended message.

Were it not for Russia’s support, so far

political and rhetorical, Mr Lukashenko

would probably have fallen by now. Sergei

Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, claims

that the country’s backing for Belarus

stems from a need to shore up all former

Soviet territory against inroads by Russia’s

Western enemies. But Mr Putin’s reasons

have more to do with maintaining power at

home than with geopolitics.

Mr Lukashenko and Mr Putin are hardly

cut from the same cloth. Boris Yeltsin, Rus-

sia’s first president and Mr Putin’s patron,

staked his legitimacy on a rejection of the

Soviet past. Mr Lukashenko’s maverick rise

to power was based on returning to it. He

implemented no market reforms and pri-

vatised no large state enterprises. He kept

wages low, but roughly equal. His critics

and opponents disappeared.

Most Belarusians did not seem too

bothered. Some Russians, their economy

in tatters and their lives upended by re-

forms, gazed over the border in nostalgic

envy at old-style collective farms, filthy but

functional factories and clean streets.

When he negotiated the agreement that

created the Union State in 1996, Mr Lukash-

enko may have entertained the hope that,

after Mr Yeltsin shuffled on, the desire for a

simpler past might see him become the two

countries’ leader himself.

When Mr Yeltsin anointed Mr Putin as

his successor in 1999 it was expressly to

prevent any such backsliding. The former

kgbman’s remit was to protect the wealth

and safety of Russia’s new elite and pre-

serve Mr Yeltsin’s reforms. But in securing

his grip on power Mr Putin appealed to

some of the same feelings as Mr Lukash-

enko. He championed those who felt they

had lost out in the 1990s, and provided

them with the symbols, at least, of the past

they held dear—rather as Mr Lukashenko

had when he restored a version of its green

and red Soviet-era flag to Belarus. He en-

couraged them to identify with him, and

returned the favour; as he said when criti-

cised for re-establishing the Soviet Union’s

Stalinist anthem in 2001: “Perhaps I and the

people are mistaken, but...” The Russian

state media, which he quickly made his

own, reinforced the identification.

How to be president for life

Mr Putin chose to act on the people’s dis-

like of the new elite not, in the main,

through economic appropriation but

through political emasculation. Those who

had made fortunes in the post-Soviet world

could expect protection as long as they got

out of politics and accepted that they now

depended on him. He was not worried

about jailing those who balked at the new

dispensation.

Having consolidated power, in 2008 Mr

Putin embarked on a sojourn as prime min-

ister in order to avoid the constitutional

limit on consecutive presidential terms,

with Dmitry Medvedev sitting in for him as

president. When they swapped jobs again

in 2012, though, it was against a back-

ground of new level of discontent. The ur-

Three-waystreet

Elected

as deputy

in Belarus

Enters local

government

in St Petersburg

USSR dissolved

President

Impeached; responds

with a constitutional

coup by means of

a referendum

Joins Boris

Yeltsin’s staff

Becomes

head of the FSB

Graduates

from university

Becomes acting

president

President

President

Abolishes

term limits

President

President

Prime minister

Elections

Begins anti-

corruption

campaigns

President

Arrested; emerges

as leader of

protest

movement

President

Runs for mayor

of Moscow

Russia annexes

Crimea

President

Barred from running for president

Sets up smart-voting campaign

President

Claims re-election,

sparking mass

protests

Changes

constitution

and resets

terms limits

Poisoned

1990 2000 2010 2020

Alexander

Lukashenko

Alexei

Navalny

Vladimir

Putin

A

L

V

P

A

N