Leaders 7N
othingisasinspiringasseeingpeopletaketothestreetsto
demand their freedoms—and nothing is as terrifying for the
dictators they are defying. In Belarus, among scenes that recall
the revolts of 1989, people are turning out in their hundreds of
thousands after a blatantly rigged election, heedless of the threat
of state violence. In the Russian city of Khabarovsk tens of thou-
sands march week after week to protest against the arrest of the
local governor and the imposition of Moscow’s rules. Vladimir
Putin is rattled. Why else is Alexei Navalny, an anti-corruption
crusader and Mr Putin’s greatest popular rival for the Russian
presidency, lying poisoned in a Berlin hospital bed?
Regimes that rule by fear, live in fear. They fear that one day
the people will no longer tolerate their lies, thieving and brutal-
ity. They try to hang on with propaganda, persecution and pa-
tronage. But it looks increasingly as if Mr Putin is running out of
tricks, and as if Alexander Lukashenko, his troublesome ally in
Minsk, is running out of road (see Briefing). That is why, despite
the Kremlin’s denials, they are falling back on the truncheon and
the syringe. And it is why, as the protests roll on, they must be
wondering whether state violence can secure their regimes.
Both leaders came to power promising relief from the chaos
that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. Mr Putin offered
his citizens a deal: stay out of politics and you will get order and
better wages. Mr Lukashenko promised Soviet-
style continuity. Mr Putin was lucky that oil
prices soared after he took over. Ordinary Rus-
sians benefited (though not nearly as much as
the regime’s cronies). Mr Putin built a mafia
state; Mr Lukashenko, an old-fashioned dicta-
torship. Both men seek to project an image of
strength through tame media—Mr Lukashenko
had himself filmed this week whizzing around
in a helicopter and brandishing an ak-47 to face down the sup-
posed Western plot to overthrow him. However, neither regime
can reform itself. They may use state television to proclaim vir-
tual change, but they struggle when it comes to the real thing.
Start with the economy. Belarus retains a theme-park version
of the old Soviet system. When Mr Lukashenko went to gather
support among the workers, he flew off to a state-owned tractor
factory like some latter-day Lenin. The country’s exports largely
consist of potash and petroleum products refined from Russian
oil that used to be discounted. Russia is different from Belarus.
Its economy is more open and less monolithic. Yet the com-
manding heights of industry and finance are in the hands of the
oligarchs in the Kremlin’s trusted circle. Mr Putin has thus been
unable to unleash competition and dynamism without upset-
ting the relationships that keep him in power. He has failed to
diversify away from hydrocarbons, so the recent double shock of
low oil prices and covid-19 has sent the economy reeling. As belts
tighten, he has nothing to offer but nationalism and nostalgia.
That cocktail is losing its potency. For two decades Mr Putin
has invoked an imaginary past of glory, plenty and certainty in
the days of the Soviet and tsarist empires. His regime is a pioneer
of disinformation. It invented the troll factory, and has created a
media environment where, as one commentator put it, “nothingistrueandeverythingispossible”.YetMrPutin’soffering looks
tired next to that of Mr Navalny, whose popular YouTube videos
are as skilful as the regime’s, but resonate with a growing sense
of frustration. They are also grounded in exhaustive research
into the regime’s corruption—and thus, in reality.
As well as failing to bring about economic and cultural re-
newal, both Mr Putin and Mr Lukashenko have failed to renew
their regimes. Neither has a plausible successor. Mr Lukashenko
has taken to trotting out his 15-year-old son, most recently in
combat gear. Mr Putin cannot easily groom a successor lest it up-
set the factions he must keep sweet. This year he attempted to
solve the problem by changing the constitution to allow himself
to stay in power until 2036, when he will be 84. But that, too, was
a sign of exhaustion. Mr Navalny, by contrast, has been busy or-
ganising opposition votes for regional elections to be held on
September 13th. He may have been removed from the stage be-
cause if Russia had seen a popular movement like that in Bela-
rus, he would have been its most plausible leader.
Mr Navalny’s poisoning is evidence that when these regimes
run out of ideas, they resort to violence. And yet Belarus shows
how hard a tool violence is to wield. Mr Lukashenko tried savage
repression by arresting and torturing protesters but, so far, it has
emboldened them and further undermined him. Sunday’s huge
protests overwhelmed his threat to use force
against them. He might have been willing to kill
people in their hundreds or thousands, but he
cannot afford to lose the loyalty of his security
forces. Mr Putin recognises that blunt force used
against the people could fuel further prot-
ests—it is why the Kremlin has largely left the
demonstrators in Khabarovsk untouched in the
hope that they will lose interest. But were the
protests to start to spread from the far east, Mr Putin would face a
similar calculus. He can arrest and intimidate the elites all he
likes. The people, in sufficient numbers, are less easy to control.
What can other countries do about all this? The answer begins
with defending the principle of human rights. Germany has cor-
rectly offered asylum to Mr Navalny. Its doctors can explain what
was done to him—and be believed by ordinary Russians. The
European Union and America have properly declined to recog-
nise the results of Mr Lukashenko’s stolen election. Their refusal
may be spun by propagandists in Minsk and Moscow as evidence
that the protests are a covert operation by the West, but the peo-
ple in the street do not believe it. Outside powers should warn
Russia that any use of force in Belarus would be followed by se-
vere sanctions. Mr Putin and Mr Lukashenko will not be re-
strained by moral, legal or diplomatic norms, but if they spill
blood to stay in office there must be consequences.
How long these two dismal regimes will survive is anyone’s
guess. Backward-looking autocracies can cling on for years. Mr
Putin and Mr Lukashenko are not alone in taking power and pro-
mising a return to an imagined era of lost glory. But the pattern is
clear. Although this may feel good at first, the people eventually
become, in the words of one Belarusian protester, “sick of them”.
And that is when dictators should be afraid. 7What Putin fears
People in Russia and Belarus are wearying of the backward-looking autocrats who rule over themLeaders