Of course, it is also possible that in many
countries, citizens will react to democratic
backsliding with a shrug, perhaps even cheer-
ing the demise of political processes that did
not serve their interests, as some have argued
is the case in Russia under Vladimir Putin or
the United States under Donald Trump ( 60 , 61 ).
It is possible that citizen acquiescence to back-
sliding is more likely in pseudodemocracies,
but more research is necessary to address this
and related questions.
Outlook
Contemporary empirical research on democ-
racy is, by necessity, limited to the range of
observed behavior. As researchers and practi-
tioners turn toward an uncertain future of
geopolitical competition, they should engage
critically with researchconducted during periods
of democracy dominance. Some findings will
prove durable, whereas others will not.
Changing geopolitics mean not just a de-
cline in Western support for democracy, but
also probable increases in interference by
Russia and China aimed at either undermining
democracy or reducing the accountability of
political elites to citizens. Countries that have
previously felt pressure to adopt democratic
institutions will not be simply left to their own
devices, free of any foreign interference. As the
United States has stepped back from a global
leadership role, China and Russia have led
efforts to undermine democratic institutions
around the world with little resistance from
what used to be democracy’s more prominent
defenders. Shifts away from democracy as a
“universal value”( 8 ) are likely to be consequen-
tial for research at the national, cross-national,
and individual levels. Without ignoring the
potential normative implications of the global
turn from democracy, researchers have an op-
portunity to provide a more complete under-
standing of the international dimensions of
democracy and dictatorship.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I thank J. Barker and A. Stephenson for excellent research assistance.
For feedback on prior drafts and instructive conversations, I am grateful
to E. Saunders, B. Paluck, S. Smith, C. Boulding, G. Hyde, participants
in the Berkeley workshop on International Relations and Comparative
Politics, and students in my fall 2019 graduate seminar, International
Relations and Domestic Politics.Competing interests:The author
declares no competing interests.
10.1126/science.abb2434Hyde,Science 369 , 1192–1196 (2020) 4 September 2020 5of5
DEMOCRACY IN THE BALANCE