theater, dance, and literature 105
for their right performances. The second question, however, asks about
the applicability of the classical paradigm itself to theater. In the few ref-
erences made in earlier chapters to theatrical rather than musical exam-
ples, we tacitly assumed that the classical paradigm does apply, at least
to canonical theatrical performances advertised under such labels as King
Lear. If this assumption is correct, then our concern, in asking the second
question might be about the scope of the classical paradigm as applied to
theater. Are some theatrical performances perhaps not helpfully viewed
in this way? But we might also ask whether the classical paradigm fails
to apply to theatrical performances in general. We shall address this more
radical suggestion in section 3 below.
2 Theatrical Performances and Performable Works
Let us assume, for the moment, that it is right to think of canonical theatri-
cal performances of the sort just described as performances of performable
works such as King Lear. In terms of Thom’s account sketched in Chapter 5,
we are assuming that such performances stand in some suitable historical-
intentional relation to the content of performance directives issued by crea-
tors of the works performed. A number of other prominent theorists have
conceived theatrical performances in a similar fashion. Richard Wollheim,
who, as we have seen, identifies musical works with types that have musi-
cal performances as their tokens, offers a parallel account of theatrical
works (1980, 82–83) According to Wollheim, a theatrical performance is
an interpretation of the prescriptions established by the author of the work
performed. And Noël Carroll describes a performable theatrical work as a
“recipe” which is “filled out” through the interpretations of those who per-
form the work (1998, 212–213).
If canonical theatrical performances are indeed properly subsumed under
the classical paradigm, then the questions that we addressed in Chapters 2
and 3 concerning performable works of music will also arise for performable
works of theater. One question – the ontological one, as to the nature of the
performable work – will presumably admit of a similar range of answers to
those canvassed in the musical case. Performable works of theater might be
viewed as pure types of some kind, or as indicated types, or as continuants,
or as generative actions, or as fictional entities. More germane in the present
context, we must ask which kinds of features performable works of theater
prescribe for their correct performances, and in what respects such works
require interpretation on the part of performers. Relatedly, when does
something count as a performance of a particular theatrical work, whether
correct or flawed? And finally, what will count as an authentic performance