Philosophy of the Performing Arts

theater, dance, and literature 127
in a misguided acceptance of the role that McFee assigns to notatability in
defining the performable work. We are, after all, familiar with performance
traditions in folk and non-Western contexts that seem quite capable of pre-
serving the identity of a performable work from performance to perform-
ance over many generations in the absence of any notational representation
of the piece. For example, as noted in Chapter 5, Gregorian and Coptic chant
traditions successfully preserved works of plainsong prior to the develop-
ment of any means of notationally transcribing these works. More generally,
oral cultures demonstrate remarkable abilities to preserve the integrity of
linguistic cultural artifacts in the absence of written records. Furthermore,
the problem with preserving work identity based on video recordings of
performances might also seem to be overstated. For, as long as we can avail
ourselves of persons schooled in the relevant performance traditions, we
can rely on their judgments in determining which features of a recorded
performance are constitutive of the dance performed. A similar solution
might answer the problem voiced by Graham. While the choreographer of a
work of modern dance may be a particularly sensitive interpreter of her own
works, the works themselves are surely open to performative interpretation
by others familiar with the choreographer’s oeuvre.
These objections are well taken, but, in identifying the conditions under
which a tradition of performable works can be sustained in the absence of
notational representations of those works, they also alert us to the possi-
bility of cases that are genuinely problematic because these conditions are
not met. It is instructive here to reflect upon current debates about the
practice of “dance reconstruction.” For those such as Kenneth Archer and
Millicent Hodgson (2000) who champion such a practice, the task is to
“ salvage what we can of ... masterworks” in the history of dance. The aim
is to present authentic performances of the works of great choreographers
such as Nijinsky and Massine. I have argued that the general artistic relevance
of authentic performance lies in its bearing on our interrogative understand-
ing of performable works. But, whereas the use of period instruments in a
performance may provide insight into why a composer prescribed a certain
sound sequence, we face two difficulties if we try to extend this argument to
dance. First, as we have seen, we often lack any clear notational representa-
tion of the works we are trying to “reconstruct,” and are limited to various
kinds of archival resources. If we don’t have contemporaries who are them-
selves experienced in the relevant performative traditions, these resources
themselves stand in need of interpretation. This also holds for video records.
But where, as with many works of dance performed prior to the inception
of video recording, we lack a visual record of performances, there is a dif-
ferent problem. Many of the aesthetic qualities of past dance performances
that might help to explain why they were choreographed in a particular way