Philosophy of the Performing Arts

performances as artworks 147
As for the second kind of property, this, in the case of a performance of
a performable work, again seems to pertain to how the work is performed.
It isn’t obvious how it can substantively contribute to the making of an inde-
pendent artistic statement by the performer or performers without violat-
ing the composer’s prescriptions.
On the other hand, suppose that a performer working with the score of
a performable work does satisfy Alperson’s conditions, in virtue of being
herself responsible for the structural qualities of the performance, or though
giving an expressive interpretation of the work distinct from what the com-
poser might have intended, or through generating such qualities on the fly.
Then if, following Alperson, we take the presence of such properties to
license viewing the performance as an artwork, it is unclear why it is better
to view this as a performance of the performable work, rather than viewing
it as a performance which uses the latter as an ingredient. For it is unclear
how, in this case, the performer can have the requisite intentions to count as
performing the work.
This is not to say that there cannot be performances that are both of
performable works and performance-works in their own right. For there
to be such performances, it is necessary that the performer can at the same
time aim to satisfy the prescriptions of the performable work and articulate
through her performance what we regard as an artistic content of her own.
This may involve originality and coherence in interpretation in the inter-
ests of articulating a distinctive content that reflects the performer’s own
individual style. But it may also derive from a certain looseness in what the
performable work prescribes, and a consequent greater freedom accorded
to the performer to use the work as a medium for the articulation of con-
tents of her own. As suggested in Chapter 6, there are reasons to think that
such a looser conception of what a work prescribes is operative in theater
and dance. This is why it is possible (although perhaps not correct) to think
of a performance of what is often referred to as “Peter Brook’s King Lear ” as
being both a performance of a work by Shakespeare and a performance of a
production by Brook.
Our response to Mark’s argument, therefore, should be that, while he
identifies a genuine possibility – a work-performance that is also a per-
formance-work – there is a tension between the requirements for being
the former and the requirements for being the latter. As a result, it seems
likely that events that meet both sets of requirements will not be the norm
in those performed arts whose prescriptions are taken to be fairly strictly
binding, such as classical music. While we may indeed appreciate a perform-
ance of a performable musical work for the aesthetic qualities attributable
to the interpretation and virtuosity of the performer, this will only some-
times justify thinking of the performance as a distinct work, rather than, to