154 performance as art
an example of non-spontaneous improvisation. But this “example” seems
to beg the question at issue. For, if Harrell indeed worked out his embel-
lishments of the Haydn work in advance, then why should we accept, as
they claim, that the performance was “undeniably” an improvisation? If the
performance was indeed preconceived, then we cannot properly take the
kind of distinctive interest in it that we take in improvisational action,
since there was no risk of the relevant sort. The only danger for Harrell,
presumably, was of professional censure for departing from Haydn’s score.
Alperson and Davies can therefore simply reject Gould and Keaton’s
description of this situation as one of improvisation. Since the burden of
proof in such cases lies on the one who seeks to overturn a consensus,
Gould and Keaton do not seem to have given us good reason to reject the
“spontaneity” view.
3 Improvisation and Performable Works: Three Models
Three Models
In the previous chapter, we took, as an example of an improvised perform-
ance, Keith Jarrett’s solo concert in Köln on January 24, 1975. One reason for
choosing this example, as we noted, was that there is clearly no pre-existing
performable work of which this was a performance. We were therefore able
to consider without other distractions the artistic status of Jarrett’s perform-
ance. But many improvised performances in jazz are commonly described
as if they are performances of performable works. The musicians announce,
for example, that they are going to play “Body and Soul,” and afterwards we
discuss their performance in those terms. However, as noted at the end of
the previous chapter, there seems to be a tension between the demands that
a performable work makes on its performers and the creative freedom we
associate with improvisation. We must consider how best to describe these
kinds of performances. We must also consider the converse possibility that at
least some improvisations are of a performable work in virtue of the fact that
the performance itself counts as the composition of that work. Such a possibil-
ity is implicit in the idea that improvisation is a kind of composition. If we are
willing to say that Jarrett composed the particular musical construction he
performed on January 24, 1975, why shouldn’t we also say that, in so doing,
Jarrett brought into being a set of prescriptions for future performances,
and thus a performable work? Might it be that the YouTube pianists to whom
I made disparaging reference in the previous chapter are more accurately
viewed as performers of such a piece?
To clarify these issues, it will be helpful to distinguish three ways in which
improvisation might enter into a performance in the performing arts.