Philosophy of the Performing Arts

196 performance as art
with access to objects distant from us, namely vision and audition.^16 Hegel
(1975), for example, claimed that “art is related only to the two theoretical
senses of sight and hearing, while smell, taste, and touch remain excluded
from the enjoyment of art.” Montero argues, however, that proprioception,
insofar as it can mis represent the disposition of my body – as, for example,
in the case of “phantom limb” experiences – has the power to represent its
object as being a certain way, and thus does not differ from vision and audi-
tion in this respect.
However, if proprioception were to be an aesthetic sense, this seems to
imply – at least on the first reading rehearsed above – that there are aesthetic
properties of some artworks – dance performances – that are accessible only
to a single individual – the performer herself. Montero argues, however,
that proprioception gives the spectator the ability to experience propriocep-
tive aesthetic properties^17 of the movements of others. Like Shusterman,
she appeals here to mirror neurons. Her claim is that, when an appropri-
ately qualified spectator observes a dancer executing a particular sequence
of movements, the neurological activity in the spectator will mirror the
relevant neurological activity in the dancer. Thus, she argues, they can share
a proprioceptive awareness of what it is to perform that sequence of move-
ments, and thus a proprioceptive awareness of its aesthetic properties. An
appropriately qualified spectator, Montero suggests, must have had training
in dance in order for the relevant mirror neurons to be activated in response
to the dancer’s movements.^18
Both Montero and Shusterman admit that their theses are speculative
extensions of the relevant current literature in neuroscience. But what
constraints are there on such speculations if they are to advance our philo-
sophical understanding of the performing arts? How far do they transcend
what has been established in the relevant neurological research, and how
does this bear on the explanatory force of the accounts? There are at least
four kinds of concern.
First, the work on visuo-motor mirror neurons was done on macaque
monkeys and has not been verified on human subjects. What has been verified
in humans is another kind of mirroring that links engaging in a given activ-
ity and imagining that one is engaging in that activity. But the relationship
between this work and the work on mirror neurons remains to be estab-
lished. Nonetheless, those scientists who work on mirror neurons generally
agree that mirror neurons operate in humans much in the way that they do
in macaques, so we can set aside this concern in the present context.
Second, and more significantly, mirror-neuronal activity in macaques has
been verified only for certain types of movements of the face and arms –
in particular, certain types of grasping behavior. This makes sense in evolu-
tionary terms given the importance of being able to mimic certain kinds of