Philosophy of the Performing Arts

(Bozica Vekic) #1

performance ii: audience and embodiment 199



  1. This idea is spelled out more clearly in Woodruff 1988. See especially
    250–253.

  2. For a critical survey of these paradoxes and their proposed solutions, see
    D. Davies 2007a, ch. 7.

  3. See Kuhn and Giles 2003.

  4. See, for example, Carroll 1988, 90–106.

  5. The example he cites in support of his view of Brechtian theater – Wallace
    Shawn’s Auntie Dan and Lemon (New York, 1985) – did not, as far as I can tell,
    employ such devices.

  6. W. B. Yeats, “Among School Children,” in Allt and Alspach 1965, 443–446.

  7. As noted in the previous chapter, however, the status of the musician as per-
    former suggests that her relationship with her instruments is not purely
    “instrumental.” If so, the issues about embodiment discussed in this section
    will arise in performing arts other than dance.

  8. For discussions of these issues, see Kozel 1997; Banes 1998, ch. 6; and
    Desmond 1999.

  9. See, for example, Sheets-Johnstone 1984; Fraleigh 1987; Shusterman 2008.
    All of these texts draw upon Merleau-Ponty 1962.

  10. See Merleau-Ponty 1962; and Gallagher 2005, ch. 1.

  11. Mirror neurons are discussed in a number of places in Gallagher 2005, espe-
    cially 220–223. For recent critical reviews of work on mirror neurons by prin-
    cipal researchers in the field, see Gallese 2009; Rizolatti and Sinigaglia 2010.

  12. See Gallagher 2005, ch. 3, for an argument to this effect.

  13. Based, presumably, on the assumption that aesthetic properties themselves
    are such that they can be accessed only by these sensory modalities.

  14. Or, on the second reading, to experience aesthetic properties proprioceptively.

  15. See Gallese 2009, 7, for a survey of research on the bearing of past motor
    experience on the operation of mirror neurons.

  16. Another problem for Shusterman’s second scenario is that, according to the
    mirror neuron research, it is goal-oriented activities such as grasping that trigger
    such neurons. It isn’t clear that posture by itself will trigger mirror-neuronal
    activity. See Gallese 2009.

  17. See again Gallese 2009.

  18. See, for example, Dutton 1979; Currie 1989; D. Davies 2004.

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