Philosophy of the Performing Arts

212 performance as art
vehicle, and, consequently, puzzlement as to what the work is about – what
artistic statement is articulated through the vehicle. But, whichever option
we favor of the three canvassed above, the wall drawings will not fall under
the performing arts because the actions prescribed by LeWitt are neither
the artistic vehicle of an artwork nor the artistic vehicle of a performance
of a performable artwork. Thus the wall drawings do not involve an artistic
performance in our sense.^10 On the “multiple work” interpretation, the
artistic vehicle of an instance of the artwork is the physical design on the
gallery wall that results from an execution of the prescribed actions. On
the “two-stage work” interpretation, the vehicle is still the product of an
executionary action, but in this case it has to be taken in association with the
prescription for that action. Details of the particular actions that brought
the physical design into existence, however, play no part in articulating the
artistic content of a LeWitt.
Most interesting for our purposes is the “conceptual work” interpreta-
tion. While it is the nature of the prescribed actions rather than the product
that is used to articulate the artistic content of the wall drawings on this
interpretation, it is the idea of carrying out such actions that serves as the
artistic vehicle. This is why this interpretation classifies the wall drawings as
conceptual works. We can define a conceptual artwork as one whose artistic
vehicle is a concept or an idea – this is what Peter Goldie and Elisabeth
Schellekens (2010) term the “idea idea” central to conceptual art.^11 Since the
prescribed actions themselves play no role in the articulation of the artistic
content of a conceptual artwork, save perhaps by enlivening the idea that is
its artistic vehicle, it fails to qualify as an artistic performance in either of our
senses, even on the “conceptual work” interpretation.
We should be struck by certain similarities between LeWitt’s wall draw-
ings viewed as conceptual pieces and some of our other puzzling cases, such
as the works by Naumann, Young, and Ono. In the latter cases, it is clear that
what matters for the articulation of an artistic content is the nature of the
prescribed performance, rather than the product of such a performance.
But, as with the “conceptual work” interpretation of the wall drawings, what
matters is not the details of an actual performance or action conforming
to what is prescribed, but the idea of such a performance or action. This
applies particularly where it is unclear whether the prescribed action can
be executed. But, even where the possibility of executing the action is not
an issue – as, for example, with the Naumann piece and the Young pieces
that prescribe releasing a butterfly or attempting to push a piano through a
wall – we must ask whether the artistic content of the work depends in any
way upon the details of an actual performance fitting those prescriptions.
Does it matter, for example, for our appreciation of Naumann’s piece, or the
Young pieces, whether anyone ever did what was prescribed and, if so, what