Philosophy of the Performing Arts

performance art and the performing arts 215
Rather, the artistic vehicle is a performance-event which articulates an artistic
content solely in virtue of being of the type in question. Although Acconci
provided no opportunity for his intended audience to directly observe what
he did, his actions qualify as an artistic performance because he elected to do
the kind of thing that he did in the way that he did it in light of his expectations
as to how his intended audience would respond to these actions. There was
no need for the intended audience to view the actual performance, however.
The relevant manifest aspects of what was done are conveyed to his intended
audience through the photographic documentation.
We can turn, finally, to Cage’s 4 ́ 33 ̋. We have, again, a number of
options. First, we might read it as a purely conceptual piece, where the
artistic content is articulated simply by the idea of such a performance.
That the work has received numerous actual performances would be, in a
sense, part of the joke. However, there are good reasons not to favor such a
reading. Part of Cage’s point, it seems, relates to the nature of the ambient
sounds that occur during a performance of the piece. Cage aims to under-
mine in the mind of the audience the standard distinction between music
and non-musical sounds. Thus the work can properly make its point only if
performed – it is not enough for the receiver to apprehend the work at a
purely conceptual level.
If we decide that the piece is indeed a performable work, however,
we can still ask what kind of performable work it is. In a very interesting
discussion of Cage’s piece, Stephen Davies (1997) argues that 4 ́ 33 ̋ is
indeed a work for performance, and is written for musical instruments,
even if they are not to be used to produce sounds. He further argues that
the work is performed by the individual who follows the prescriptions
in the score, not by the audience whose responses to what is done (or
not done!) provide some of the ambient sounds through which the work
makes its point. However, Davies argues, it should not be regarded as a
performable musical work, since it fails to satisfy a necessary condition for
being such a work: that it prescribe to its performers that they bring into
being “ organized sound .” While the noises that occur during a performance
of 4 ́ 33 ̋ may have some structure, the nature of this structure is not due
to the actions of the musician.^14
According to Davies, 4 ́ 33 ̋ is “an artistic happening, a conceptual
piece that reflects on the world of music without itself being a musical
work.” As such, it is properly classified as a theatrical work: “It is not a
work of musical theater, such as opera, but a performance piece about
music” (S. Davies 1997, 26). He cites Kendall Walton as another philoso-
pher attracted by this kind of approach (Walton 1987, 76–77). While
Davies refers to 4 ́ 33 ̋ as a “conceptual piece,” it should be apparent from
our earlier discussion of LeWitt that it is not a conceptual work in the