Philosophy of the Performing Arts

the nature of the performable work 39
in virtue of the possibilities for generating sequences of sounds in various
ways. As such, the norm-type pre-exists the compositional activity of the
composer. The norm-type-as-indicated, on the other hand, is an “initiated
type” that comes into existence only through an intentional human act of
the appropriate kind. Thus performable works, as initiated types, are creat-
able. Furthermore, in virtue of the contextual elements intrinsic to them,
they are finely individuated in the manner that the contextualist requires.
In addition, since performable works, as initiated types, are types , they are
repeatable through those performances that are their tokens. More specifi-
cally, according to Levinson, the work-instances of a performable musical
work are events that comply with everything prescribed through the work’s
S/PM structure and that stand in the right causal/intentional relation to the
composer’s act of indicating that structure. As we saw earlier, a performable
work may have performances that fail to qualify as work-instances. Such per-
formances, for Levinson, stand in the right kind of causal-intentional rela-
tion to the composition of the work, but fall short of full compliance with
the work’s prescriptions while still succeeding to a reasonable degree.
This option is very attractive if we are persuaded by the arguments for
contextualism or believe that performable works are the creations of their
authors. However, some have found the idea of initiated types, as entities,
puzzling (see, for example, Currie 1989, 57–61; Dodd 2000). More signifi-
cantly, it has been suggested that, to the extent that initiated types are still
types , they must exist eternally and therefore cannot be created. In arguing
for the creatability of performable works qua initiated types, Levinson relies
on the criterion of type existence we characterized earlier as ET1 according
to which a type exists at a given time just in case it is possible for it to have
tokens at that time. He reasons that an initiated type cannot have tokens until
it is initiated, which in this case is when the relevant norm-kind is indicated by
the composer. If, however, it is ET2 and not ET1 that provides the correct cri-
terion for the existence of a type, then it seems that even initiated types will
not be creatable. ET2 , we may recall, identifies, for each type, an associated
property that sets out the condition that must be met by (well-formed)
tokens of that type. It then claims that types exist at a time just in case their
associated properties exist at that time, and that properties exist eternally as
long as there is at least one time – past, present, or future – at which they
have, or could have, an instance. It follows that properties (and thus types)
exist eternally if they exist at all. If this is the right account of type existence,
then Levinson’s proposed conditions under which we have a work-instance
of a performable work qua initiated type will furnish us with our “associated
property” for the initiated type. If works are taken to be norm- types , whether
indicated or not, they will still be individuated in terms of a condition for cor-
rect instantiation that can be expressed as a property.^26 This property (and, by