Philosophy of the Performing Arts

appreciating performable works in performance 61
into the technical details of these requirements here.^14 But it will be helpful
to relate them to the kind of work that they do in ensuring that a score
can fulfill its primary function. This will allow us to identify two significant
implications of Goodman’s account.
Some of the notational requirements for a score are necessary if the score
is to fulfill the first part of its primary function by defining a work. If we are to
determine whether a performance complies with the score of a work W , we
must be able to tell, from the inscription used by the composer to prescribe
certain things for correct performances of W , of which particular score it is an
inscription. Only if we know this will we be able to tell which requirements
W prescribes for its correct performances, and thus whether a particular per-
formance meets those requirements. Goodman lays down certain conditions
that must be met if a score is to define a work in this sense. For example, no
inscription can belong to more than one score, and it must be possible at least
in principle to determine which score an inscription belongs to.
Further notational requirements for a score pertain to the second thing
a score of a musical work must do to fulfill its primary function, namely, be
uniquely determined by each of the work’s instances. What this means is that
it must always be possible, at least in principle, to tell which score uniquely
matches a given correct performance, and thus of which work it is a per-
formance. If this is to be possible a performance cannot comply with two
distinct scores.^15 Also, we must be able, at least in principle, to determine
with which score a given performance complies.
These last two requirements, which are necessary if the score for W is to be
uniquely determined by each correct performance of W , have some surpris-
ing consequences. First, Goodman argues that only some of the elements that
we find on a standard musical score meet these requirements for notational-
ity. There is no problem with the standard musical symbols – for example, the
use of five-line staff and clef signs, the marks used to represent the pitch and
duration of notes, time signatures and key signatures. Problems arise, how-
ever, when we consider the use of verbal elements. Take, for example, the use
of words such as “ allegro ,” “ allegro vivace ,” “ allegro non troppo ,” etc., to indicate
tempo. A correct performance of W might fall under a number of different
labels of this sort, since a score might verbally specify the tempo more or less
precisely. For example, a performance that complies with a score that speci-
fies “ allegro vivace ” might also be a particularly vivace performance of a work
whose score specifies “ allegro .” Thus, if we include such verbal indications of
tempo in the score, there may be no single right way of matching a score to
a given performance, assuming that all we have to go on is the performance
itself, without inquiring into its history of production. Thus, if the score is to
enable us to divorce status as an instance of a work from history of produc-
tion, and if the primary function of a score requires that a score for W be