appreciating performable works in performance 69
of the score to allow that performances departing from the notational require-
ments of the score may count as genuine, albeit incorrect, performances of
the work. Consider a work W of which we have two performances: P1 , which
complies completely with the score for W , and P2 , which departs from that
score in a single note. Given a performance of P2 , the score that is uniquely
determined by that performance will be one that differs in respect of this
single note from the score for W. Since works themselves are defined relative
to what is prescribed for correct performance, and since the score derived
from P2 differs from the score for W in what it prescribes, the score derived
from P2 must be the score for a different work – term this W . Thus, P2 is not
only an incorrect performance of W but also a correct performance of _W _.
Now imagine P3 , another performance of W * which is flawed in departing
from the score for W in respect of a single note other than the one in respect
of which P2 differs from P1. The same reasoning that led us to conclude that
P2 must be a correct performance of W as well as an incorrect performance
of W will lead us to conclude that P3 must be a correct performance of another
work W whose score differs from that of W * in respect of a single note and
from that of W in respect of two notes. W * in turn will have an incorrect
performance P4 , and so on. Obviously we can extend this story to further
performances and further works. Of all such cases something analogous to
the following reasoning obtains: Since P1 is a performance of the same work
as P2 (they are both performances of W ), and P2 is a performance of the same
work as P3 (they are both performances of W ), and P3 is a performance of
the same work as P4 (they are both performances of W ), it follows that P1 is
a performance of the same work as P4.
- The wording here reflects the intuition that what matters, in ascribing per-
formances to works performed, is not the actual historical origins of the score
from which the performers are playing but their beliefs about those origins
insofar as this guides their interpretation of the score. Suppose we have two
works from different composers, A and B , with identical scores. Suppose a
group of performers intends to perform A ’s work, believes that the score in
front of them is of that work, and is guided in its performance by knowledge
of conventions for interpreting scores in the performing community to whom
A ’s work was originally addressed. Suppose, however, that in fact the
performers are playing from a score of B ’s work. Surely what we have is a
performance of A ’s work – if someone switched the scores as a practical joke
prior to the performance, this wouldn’t change the identity of the work per-
formed. What matters is the performers’ intention to play a particular work
whose prescriptions are contained in the score from which they are playing.
So, if the only score available to them is one that they believe or know to be
of B ’s work, they can still perform A ’s work as long as the scores of the two
works explicitly prescribe the same things for correct performance. - Note that we have not ruled here on whether the second of these perform-
ances is a performance of the work : timbral sonicists may say that it is and
instrumentalists may say that it isn’t.