70 performance and the classical paradigm
- An instrumentalist like Levinson, however, will insist that there is such a
salient difference which excludes such performances from being work-
instances. For, as noted in Chapter 2, Levinson argues that the expressive
qualities that we ascribe to a piece of music may depend in part upon the
physical nature of the activities we take to be involved in producing the sounds
we hear. If so, such expressive qualities might not be graspable by those who
attend a performance of a work, composed for string quartet, which is given
a sonically indistinguishable rendering on a PTS. If we assume these expres-
sive properties are properties of the work bearing on its proper appreciation,
then the work will not be properly appreciable through such a performance.
The latter, then, will not be a work-instance of the work. Its live instances
must be restricted to performances on the prescribed instruments. See the
discussion of Levinson’s views on “authenticity” in Chapter 4. - For more on the significance of this distinction, see D. Davies 2009b.
- No general reason, but see n, 19 above.
- This would require a more nuanced formulation in the case of performable
works, for the reasons noted in n. 7 above. I ignore this complication here. - For a defense of this thesis, see D. Davies 2010.