90 performance and the classical paradigm
sequence of sounds; in the case of dance, it is the production of a sequence of
bodily motions, and in the case of theater it is the production of a sequence
of verbal (usually) and non-verbal actions. Thom doesn’t think that all artis-
tic performances fit this model. There can be performances that are not of
works – the most obvious examples being improvisations – in any of the
performance media just noted. But, he maintains, a performance of a per-
formable work is generally aesthetically richer and more satisfying than an
improvised performance (Thom 1993, 69–72). First, an improvisation is
unlikely to have the same degree of structural complexity as a performance
of a performable work, given the manner in which it is created. Furthermore,
we will not be able to enjoy the performance both for its own sake and for
the way in which it interprets a performable work. Thus, while Thom ques-
tions what he terms the “valorization” of the work over performance, he
takes the classical paradigm to have wide scope in the performing arts, and
also takes this to be generally a good thing.
A number of writers, however, have offered more or less radical chal-
lenges to these assumptions. In assessing these challenges, we shall, in the
remainder of this chapter, begin with performances of Western classical
music, and then examine other musical genres. In the following chapter,
we shall look at theater and dance, and also consider the suggestion that, far
from having narrower scope than many think, the classical paradigm actually
has wider scope, encompassing at least some works of literature.
2 The Scope of the Paradigm in Classical Music
Some have suggested that, while a particular model of artistic performance
may fit a performance of Sibelius’s Second Symphony very well, the same
model cannot usefully be applied to other performances in the classical tradi-
tion, for example those of early music. There is disagreement, however, as to
where precisely to draw the line, and how radical a departure from the classical
paradigm is required to accommodate such cases. For some, this is merely a
family squabble within the broader camp of the paradigm, to be resolved by
adopting different versions of the latter for different musical periods. Levinson,
for example, prefaces his arguments for an instrumentalist and contextualist
conception of the musical work by explicitly confining the scope of his inquiry
to “that paradigm of a musical work, the fully notated ‘classical’ composition
of Western culture, for example, Beethoven’s Quintet for piano and winds in
E-flat, op. 16” (1980, 64–65). In response to criticisms from Kivy, he grants
that instrumentalism will not hold for “most music before 1750” (Levinson
1990b, 232). Thus he seems to subscribe to two different conceptions of what
a musical work prescribes for its performances: instrumentalism for works