The EconomistOctober 17th 2020 Middle East & Africa 412 Glencorehaslongdeniedbeinginvolvedin
anyimpropertransactionsandhassaidit
isco-operatingwithinvestigators.
Whilebigfirmsrakeinmillions,many
ofthelittleguyslanguishinjail.Theprison
inKolwezi,thelargestcityinthemining
region,iscrammedwithmencaughtsteal-
ingcopperandcobalt.Morethana hun-
dredinmatesoccupyonestinkingroom,
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betweenanother’slegs. Prisonersareal-
lowedtousethetoiletonlyoncea day,so
theyoftenurinateintheirclothes.“Irea-
soneditwasa stageoflifeandthatallthe
sufferingwouldpass,”recallsCiscoNgoyi,
whospentsixmonthsinjaillastyearafter
beingcaughtonanindustrialsite.
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garsonroadsides.Dusty,makeshiftsettle-
ments,similartoKawama,abutthecity,
whileChinesecasinosandswankyhotels
occupythecentre.A cynicmightseeherea
microcosmofCongoitself,wheremineral
wealthishoggedbya powerfulfew,while
themanyscrabbletogetby,andpraytostay
outofjail. 7
T
he f-14 tomcat was a cutting-edge
fighter jet when it first flew 50 years
ago. It acquired iconic status when it
starred in “Top Gun”, a Hollywood block-
buster, during the Reagan era. Newer
planes have long since taken its place in
America’s air force. But Tomcats are still a
feature of Iran’s decrepit armed forces,
which acquired the planes (one is pictured)
shortly before the Islamic revolution in- Many of the country’s other weapons,
from infirm British tanks to vintage Ameri-
can helicopters, are also museum pieces.
But the expiry of a United Nations arms
embargo on October 18th allows the coun-
try’s generals to dream of shinier weapons.
Iran’s armed forces have long had to
make do with junk. Though America and
Britain sold advanced weapons to the pro-
Western shah in the 1960s and 1970s, the
theocracy that followed lost somewhere
between one-half and two-thirds of that
equipment in a brutal eight-year war with
Iraq. The departure of Western technicians
and an informal arms embargo prevented
the Iranians from maintaining or replacing
what was left. In 2007 the unimposed a
formal arms embargo, amid rising ten-
sions over Iran’s nuclear programme.
In 2015 Iran signed a deal with six world
powers, under which it agreed to curb its
nuclear programme in return for the lifting
of international sanctions—and the arms
embargo in 2020. The Trump administra-
tion walked out of the deal in 2018 and de-
manded that the embargo remain in place.
But those efforts ended in humiliation in
August, when America was rebuffed at the
unby allies and rivals alike. The embargo
will therefore expire as planned on October
18th, though restrictions on Iran’s develop-
ment of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles
will remain in place until 2023.
In theory, it will be legal for Iran to buy
and sell weapons to and from whomever it
chooses. Russia has hinted that it is keen to
do business. “We have said since the very
first day that there will be no problem with
selling weapons to Iran from October 19th,”
said Russia’s ambassador to Iran. Last year
an assessment by America’s Defence Intel-
ligence Agency said Iran would probably
buy advanced Russian fighter jets. China is
also eager to sell its arms, which tend to be
cheaper. China and Iran are working to-
wards an agreement on economic and mil-
itary co-operation, including joint weap-
ons development.
Yet a full-blown arms spree is unlikely
for several reasons. Russia and China both
want to keep good relations with Iran’s
deeper-pocketed Arab rivals. Iran’s annual
military spending was $12.6bn last year;
Saudi Arabia spent almost five times that.
Nor is Iran about to catch up soon. Ameri-
ca’s own sanctions—separate from the un
measures (and more draconian)—have
strangled Iran’s economy and sent its cur-
rency to new lows, pushing up the price of
arms imports. America’s Treasury Depart-
ment continues to hound anyone doing
business with Iran, deterring many coun-
tries from taking the risk. Iran is also keen
on building up its own defence industry,
though (with the exception of missiles anddrones) it produces more hot air than mod-
ern weapons. An ostensibly new tank un-
veiled in 2016, for instance, used a chassis
from a 1950s American one, notes Robert
Czulda of the University of Lodz.
Most important, Iran’s military strategy
does not depend on traditional weapons,
but on a mix of ballistic missiles to deter at-
tacks and a sprawling network of friendly
militia groups—from Hizbullah in Leba-
non and Syria to the Houthis in Yemen—to
project power. Accordingly, Iran’s Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps, which con-
trols the missiles and works with the mili-
tias, is politically and militarily more pow-
erful than the regular armed forces. In June
Mike Pompeo, America’s secretary of state,
was ridiculed when he tweeted that new
Iranian warplanes would mean that “Eu-
rope and Asia could be in Iran’s crosshairs”.
A map attached to his tweet used ranges
that implied one-way suicide missions.
“I don’t think this is going to be a mo-
ment where they just get a bunch of tanks
and march across the Middle East, because
they are already present through proxies
and drones,” says Behnam Ben Taleblu of
the Foundation for Defence of Democra-
cies, a think-tank in Washington that has
argued in favour of continuing the embar-
go. Iran does not have a history of huge
arms deals, but Hassan Ahmadian of the
University of Tehran thinks it will make
some purchases “to enhance its defensive
capabilities and to showcase the end of the
embargo”. It may focus on better cruise
missiles and modernisation of its diesel
submarines, says Mr Ben Taleblu. Western
officials say their biggest concern is that
Iran will pass on imported weapons or
technology to its proxies abroad. But if the
country hopes to tune up its ageing Tom-
cats, it is out of luck. America shredded the
last of its fleet a decade ago, precisely to ex-
clude that possibility.^7Iran will soon be free to restock its
armoury, but a buying spree is unlikelyIran’s armed forcesAfter the embargo
Ready for the “Top Gun” sequel