The Economist - USA (2020-10-17)

(Antfer) #1

60 Finance & economics The EconomistOctober 17th 2020


2 frompropertysalestoseaportcargo.The
resultsarestark.Whereasofficialgdpgrew
by48%incumulativetermsfrom 2014 to
2019,theyputthetrueexpansionat33%.
China’sboffinscantoturntoanunlike-
lycornerfora partialdefence:America’s
FederalReserve.JohnFernald,EricHsuand
MarkSpiegel,economistsattheFed’sSan
Francisco arm, have also constructed a
proxy forChinesegrowth, laidoutin a
forthcomingpaper,usingindicatorssuch
asconsumerexpectationsandfixed-asset
investment.They,too,concludethatoffi-
cialgrowthhasbeenimplausiblysmooth
since2013.Buttheyfindthattruegrowth
wasfasterabouthalfthetimeandslower
theotherhalf(seechartonpreviouspage).
The crucial test for these proxies is
whethertheyofferinsightsaboutChina’s
trajectorythataremissingintheofficial
gdpdata.Bothpassthetest.Theupsand
downs of their measures better explain
China’speriodicshiftsinfiscalandmone-
tary policies than theuncannily steady
pathofofficialrealgdpdoes.TheFedecon-
omistssubjecttheirproxytoanothertest,
constructingittobeinlinewithChinese
imports,asmeasuredbythereportedex-
portsoftradingpartners—inotherwords,a

datasource entirely free frompotential
Chinesefiddling.Incountrieswithreliable
statistics,importgrowthtypicallymoves
closelywiththatofgdp. Thatisthecasefor
theirproxy—butnotforofficialgdp.
DoesthismeanthatChinesedataare,
putbluntly,garbage?No.TheFedecono-
mistsfindthatChinesestatistics,withthe
notableexceptionofrealgdp, havebecome
morereliableovertime.Theanalystswith
CapitalEconomicsconcludethatthemain
problemoccursinthetransformationof
nominal figuresinto real ones;statisti-
ciansappeartouseexcessivelylowinfla-
tionrateswhencalculatingrealgrowthso
thatthegovernmentcan hit itstargets.
Nominalmeasurements aremore trust-
worthy,andthatmatterswhentryingtoas-
sess,say,China’sdebtburdenorthesizeof
itseconomyrelativetoAmerica’s.
Theproxies,alas,offerslightlydifferent
narratives about China’s economy this
year.Capitalbelievesthattheslowdownin
thefirstquarterwasmuchsharperthanre-
ported,whereastheFed’scalculationssug-
gest thatit was milder. Both, however,
agreeonthemostsalientpoint: there-
boundsincethenhasbeenbig.Thecrowd-
edstreetsandbuzzingshopsdonotlie. 7

M


ost bankershave been working fran-
tically for the past six months. Trad-
ers handled record-high volumes in chop-
py markets. Their colleagues issued
mountains of equity and debt as compa-
nies sought to withstand the economic
downturn by amassing capital. Commer-
cial bankers offered forbearance to strug-
gling borrowers, and were forced to write
down the value of loans as the likelihood of
being repaid fell. As a result, investment-
banking revenues soared in the first half of
the year, and most commercial banks suf-
fered losses as they set aside provisions for
bad loans. That made for slender profits at
Bank of America, Citigroup and JPMorgan
Chase, the big hybrid banks. Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley, which are more
skewed towards investment banking, post-
ed stellar profits. Wells Fargo, a mostly
commercial lender, lost money.
The third-quarter earnings reported by
five of these banks on October 13th and 14th
tell a different story (the sixth, Morgan
Stanley, was due to report on the 15th, as
The Economistwent to press). Investment
bankers were still busy—trading revenues

were up by around 20% compared with the
third quarter of 2019, and Goldman’s pro-
fits doubled on the year. But the pace of ac-
tivity was leisurely compared with the sec-
ond quarter, when trading revenues were
up by 60% over the same period in 2019.
Banks also think they are now largely
prepared for losses. In the first half of the
year the big five booked $60bn-worth of

provisions for bad loans. But those in the
third quarter were skinnier, at just $6.5bn,
not far off those in the third quarter of 2019
(see chart). The stock of allowances for bad
loans adds up to $106bn, about 2.8% of
banks’ loan books. Non-performing assets
are creeping up, but are still far from the
levels that would wipe out provisions. Jen-
nifer Piepszak, the chief financial officer of
JPMorgan, said that customers were “hold-
ing up well”.
As the perils of higher provisions and
the spoils from market volatility became
less dramatic, investors’ attention turned
towards a more prosaic influence on earn-
ings: banks’ net interest incomes, or the
difference between the interest collected
on loans and other assets and the interest
paid on deposits and other funding. These
have been squeezed by interest-rate cuts by
the Federal Reserve and low long-term
bond yields. America’s five large banks
earned $44bn in net interest income in the
third quarter, 13% less than in the same per-
iod last year. All together, reduced interest
income, calmer trading revenues and sub-
siding credit costs meant that profits were
lower than they were a year ago, but less
starkly so than in the second quarter. Pro-
fits fell by 11% across Bank of America, Citi-
group and JPMorgan in the third quarter,
compared with a drop of 56% in the second.
The question now is what banks will do
with their earnings. Regulators, still
scarred by the global financial crisis of
2007-09, want well-padded shock absorb-
ers. On September 30th the Fed said that
the 33 banks with more than $100bn in as-
sets would remain barred from buying
back shares in the fourth quarter. Dividend
payments are allowed, in contrast to Eu-
rope, but capped. As a result many banks
are accruing capital. JPMorgan’s common-
equity capital ratio rose to 13.0%, from
12.3% in the third quarter last year. At Bank
of America the ratio climbed to 11.9%, from
11.4%. That is about $35bn above regulatory
requirements, Paul Donofrio, its chief fi-
nancial officer, told analysts.
With buy-backs off the table, bosses can
either spend or save the cash. Some are
splashing out. Bank of America said it had
invested in adding branches in the third
quarter, pandemic notwithstanding. Oth-
ers are acquiring new businesses. On Octo-
ber 8th Morgan Stanley announced that it
was buying Eaton Vance, an asset manager,
for $7bn. That came just days after it com-
pleted its purchase of E*Trade, an online
trading platform.
The extra capital could also come in
handy if the economy fares worse than
even the dismal scenarios baked into loan-
loss provisions. Banks’ bosses sounded
cautiously optimistic that this would not
be the case. But investors have their
doubts. Banks’ share prices are still a third
below their levels at the start of the year. 7

NEW YORK
Banks say they are prepared for losses. Now what?

Wall Street

The calm after the storm


Forewarned is forearmed
United States, five biggest banks*, $bn

Source:Banks’
earningsstatements

*JPMorganChase,Citigroup,Bank of
America,WellsFargoandGoldmanSachs

40

30

20

10

0

2019 2020

Q4Q3Q2 Q3Q2Q1

Loan-lossprovisions

Charge-offs
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