The Economist - USA (2020-11-07)

The EconomistNovember 7th 2020 United States 25

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swingtowardsMrBidenwastheclustering

ofcollege-educatedAmericans.Indemo-

graphicterms,thestoryoftheelectionis

thereforea slightlesseningofracialpolar-

isation(thephenomenonofminorityvot-

ersattachingthemselvestotheDemocratic

Party)anda slightincreaseineducational

polarisation(thephenomenonofcollege-

educatedvotersdesertingtheRepublican

Party).Itisunwisetoplottrendlinesfar

intothefuture,butthislookslikegood

newsforthefutureprospectsofRepubli-

cans,givenhowdiversethecountryisbe-

coming,andgiventhatonly36%ofAmeri-

canshavea bachelor’sdegree.

Tellingit howit isn’t

Despitetheirrelativelysmallnumber,col-

legegraduateshavedisproportionatecul-

turalswayinAmerica.Thistendstodistort

perceptionsofwhatthecountryisreally

like,bothfrominsideAmericaandfrom

outside.Averylargeshareofcollege-edu-

catedAmericansbelievedthatMrTrump

wasbotha disastrouspresidentandalsoa

threattoAmerica’sgoverninginstitutions.

Theyalsobelievedhewasa racist,whose

dog-whistlesaboutimmigrantsandAfri-

can-Americanswouldmakehimtoxicto

non-whites. Thisview is notas widely

sharedastheyassumedit was.

Whymightthatbeso?A surveyfromthe

Cato Institute, a libertarian think-tank,

earlierthisyearfoundthat“strongliberals”

were the only ideological group in the

countrywhofeltfreetoexpresstheirpolit-

ical opinions without causing offence.

Everyone else, from regular liberals to

“strong conservatives”, felt somewhat

muzzledbythepoliticalcultureinwhich

theysoughttoexpressthoseopinions.If

thisisaccurate,theremaybenoamountof

reweightingthatcanmakepollsaccurate.

A further, possibly related problem for

prognosticatorsisthata lotofvotersjust

donottrustpollstersenoughtoanswer

theirquestions:in 2016 fewerthan1 in 200

callsmadebypollingfirmsresultedinan

interviewwitha voter.Thesamewillprob-

ablyhavebeentruethistime.

MrBiden,then,lookssettobecomethe

46thpresident,butbyanarrowmargin.

Hisjust-aboutvictorywillreignitea long-

runningargumentintheDemocraticParty

aboutwhetherleft-wingpopulismmight

beabetterantidoteto right-wingpopu-

lism,a disputethatMrBiden’svictoryin

theprimariesseemedtohaveputtorest.

TheresultlookslikelytokeeptheRepubli-

canPartyinthralltoMrTrumpandTrum-

pismfortheforeseeablefuture(seeLexing-

ton).AnditmeansthatMrBiden,ifheis

indeedswornincomeJanuary20th,willbe

highlyconstrainedwhenitcomestodo-

mesticpolicy(see nextstory).Yetifthe

presidentitelectsisthemostvisiblemea-

sure of its values, America really has

changedcourse. 7

F

orgetnukingthe filibuster, packing

theSupremeCourt and dismantling the

electoral college—the prizes that bold

Democrats salivated over after their ex-

pectedlandslidevictory. Those dreams are

now dead. The pre-existing Democratic

majorityintheHouse of Representatives

hasweakened,though it has still held. The

Senate,ontheother hand, looks likely to

remaininRepublican control, even though

someresultsareyet to be finalised. Mitch

McConnell, the majority leader who

coasted to a seventh term representing

Kentucky,wasperfectly content to stymie

BarackObamafor years. At 78, he would

probablyremainset in his ways if Joe Biden

hasindeedwona narrow presidential vic-

tory.Thatpromises another four years of

gridlockandhyper-partisan dysfunction.

Forget,too,thechance of a green-infra-

structureplan,a reform of health care—or

muchseriouslegislating of any sort.

Opinionpollsnot only overstated Mr Bi-

den’snationalstanding, but also the pros-

pectsfordown-ballot Democrats. In races

fortheHouseofRepresentatives in 2018,

Democratscaptured a resounding 54% of

thevotescastforeither major party. Nancy

Pelosi, the House speaker, thought she

wouldbesurfinganother blue wave. But

preliminaryresults suggest that in 2020

thatnational margin actually shrank by

fourpercentagepoints to near-parity. Giv-

enthatMrTrumpis facing a clear loss in

thepopularvote,that suggests that down-

ballot Republicans overperformed relative

to the president all over the country.

Two years ago, Democrats were excited

by their pickups in moderate, suburban

districts in unexpected places like Oklaho-

ma City, Charleston in South Carolina and

Cedar Rapids, Iowa. All of those seats have

now reverted to Republican control, while

Democrats did not really manage to add to

their territory elsewhere (excepting a pair

of open seats in North Carolina). There will

probably be more Republican flips, but

election projectors think that the Demo-

cratic majority in the chamber will survive,

even if it is eroded.

Great expectations for the Senate were

similarly dampened once results came in.

The two most endangered Republican in-

cumbents—Martha McSally of Arizona and

Cory Gardner of Colorado—lost as expect-

ed, as did Doug Jones, the improbable

Democratic senator from Alabama. That

left 47 Democratic seats, four short of a ma-

jority (or three if a Democratic vice-presi-

dent broke ties). Some races are still un-

called, but the maths look likely to work for

Republicans. Susan Collins of Maine won a

comfortable victory and Thom Tillis of

North Carolina looks likely to have got a

narrow one. More long-shot opportunities

for the Democrats, like capturing seats in

Iowa and Montana, were decisively beaten

back. And their more improbable map-ex-

pansion projects failed miserably.

At least $100m was raised to unseat

Lindsey Graham, the Republican senator

from South Carolina, who nonetheless

won by 14 percentage points. “This is the

worst return on investment in the history

of American politics,” gloated Mr Graham

in his victory speech. Neither did the $88m

raised in Kentucky to unseat Mr McConnell

look well-spent: he cruised to a 21-point

victory. The ultimate composition of the

Senate might not be decided until Georgia

holds run-off elections in January—though

these are probable Republican holds.

Most modern presidents have had uni-

fied party control of Congress at the start of

their term (before voters usually wrench it

back in mid-term elections). Should Mr Bi-

den win, he is unlikely to be afforded that.

This means that much of his ambitious

agenda—and much of the all-consuming

policy debate during the Democratic prim-

ary about which shade of health-care re-

form was best—will in effect become moot.

Mr Biden would preside not over a realign-

WASHINGTON,DC

Dividedanddivisive government is here to stay

Congress

Spellunbroken

Still McConnell

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