The EconomistNovember 14th 2020 Middle East & Africa 432
1ing aggressively pursued by the npa: a
state-subsidised dairy costing hundreds of
millions of rand linked to Mr Zuma’s close
allies, the Gupta brothers, for whom Mr
Magashule’s son, Tshepiso, worked.
That much is known about state capture
is testament to many of South Africa’s in-
stitutions. Investigative journalists, ngos,
civil servants such as Thuli Madonsela, the
former public protector, and dogged oppo-
sition politicians, especially from the
Democratic Alliance, have all helped reveal
the extent of the graft. But whether anyone
goes to jail will depend on a criminal-jus-
tice system eviscerated in the Zuma era.
Upon taking office, Mr Ramaphosa
pledged to revive organisations like the
npa, the Hawks and the South African Rev-
enue Service. He has replaced party hacks
with competent leaders and let them get on
with their jobs. South Africans are under-
standably impatient. But prosecutors are
finally racking up arrests. And if the state
wins its case against Mr Magashule, it
would be the clearest sign yet that the pres-
ident’s anti-corruption drive is serious.
History suggests that a successful pros-
ecution will not be easy. No ancpolitician
has so far been convicted for taking part in
state capture. For 15 years Mr Zuma has
been in and mostly out of court for his al-
leged part in a corrupt arms deal dating
back to the late 1990s. Mr Magashule may
try to copy the mix of denial and delay that
has served the former president well. And
although the relevant law defines corrup-
tion fairly broadly, it may be hard to prove
Mr Magashule’s involvement; his former
colleagues note that he had a habit of using
other people’s mobile phones.
Mr Ramaphosa should benefit from
having his rival occupied, even if Mr Ma-
gashule refuses to step down from his post
while he is facing charges. Since Mr Rama-
phosa took office his (over)cautious re-
formism has been hobbled by internal op-
ponents. Though these include more than
just allies of Mr Magashule, the secretary-
general’s arrest should give the president
greater power in negotiations with party
factions and trade unions, for example
concerning his efforts to slow the growth of
the public wage bill.
Mr Ramaphosa nevertheless has much
to do to convince increasingly sceptical
South Africans that the anccan change.
State capture was about more than just in-
dividuals, however powerful. It was about
an entire system of corruption, deploy-
ment of party members and patronage.
Back in Dark City, the residents’ mood is
also sombre. Most scoff at the notion that
arrests would signal a change in their for-
tunes. The best some people hope for is to
be next in line for the spoils of a rotten sys-
tem. Approaching your correspondent, a
young man calls out: “Write it down—we
want the next tender!” 7I
n his studioFumba Chama gets ready to
play his new song. Unlike in most Zam-
bian workplaces there is no photograph on
the wall of Edgar Lungu, the president
since 2015. Looking down instead is a
young Kenneth Kaunda, who led Zambia
for 27 years after independence from Brit-
ain in 1964.
If that is a silent protest, then out of the
speakers comes a louder one. In “Coward of
the County” Mr Chama raps laconically
about Mr Lungu’s failings over—why
not?—a sample of the song of the same
name by the late Kenny Rogers, a bearded
American country star. It is his latest track
about how the ruling Patriotic Front (pf)
has crushed civic freedoms and crashed
the economy. As if to prove his point, the
authorities have repeatedly arrested and
intimidated Mr Chama, whose stage name
is PilAto. “People say I have no fear,” he
says, “but I’m scared.”
Mr Chama is not alone. Unless it pays an
overdue $42.5m coupon, or bondholders
give it more time, on November 13th Zam-
bia will officially default on its debt.
Though it would be the first African state to
do so since the start of the pandemic, co-
vid-19 is not the root cause of its troubles.
More important is the pf’s misrule, which
will worsen ahead of elections in August- “We are heading in the same direction
as Zimbabwe,” says Laura Miti of Alliance
for Community Action (aca), an ngo.
Any such comparison to the failing
state on its southern border is cause for
alarm. Since 1991, when Mr Kaunda eventu-
ally made way for multiparty democracy,
the country has held regular, if flawed,
elections. In the 2000s gdp grew by an av-
erage of 7% per year, thanks in part to a
soaring price for copper, which accounts
for four-fifths of exports.
After it took office in 2011 the pfwas not
helped by droughts and a fall in the copper
price. Yet it made matters worse by ramp-
ing up borrowing. Government debt as a
share of gdphas risen from 21% to 120%
(see chart). External debt has increased
seven-fold, as Zambia borrowed in dollars
from Western bondholders and Chinese
state banks. It now spends four times as
much on external debt as on health care.
Much of the money has been wasted. A
dual carriageway north from Lusaka esti-
mated to have cost $1.2bn stops on the out-
skirts of the capital. Other roads have been
commissioned at inflated prices (roughly
twice the African average per kilometre),
suggesting ample opportunities for the
well-connected to take a cut. An order for
fire engines and a cash-transfer scheme for
the poor are among many fishy tenders.
The Financial Intelligence Centre, an offi-
cial watchdog, found $520m worth of mon-
ey-laundering or suspicious transactions
in 2018, up from $382m in 2017. Institutions
meant to oversee borrowing—the finance
ministry and parliament—have been by-
passed as departments and agencies with-
in the presidency have racked up debts.
Ordinary Zambians are paying the price.
Annualised inflation was 16% in October,
versus 11% a year ago. The local currency,
the kwacha, has lost almost a third of its
value against the dollar this year. Civil ser-
vants are not paid on time. Graduates
struggle to find jobs; such is the plight of
teacher-training graduates that the Unem-
ployed Teachers Association of Zambia
represents tens of thousands of people.
Zambia has asked the imffor a cheap
loan to tide it over. An imfprogramme
would also reassure creditors who worry
that any relief they provide will only bol-
ster the pf’s election war chest or the ac-
counts of Chinese lenders. Yet the antics of
the Lungu regime have done little to con-
vince creditors that it can be trusted.
In August Mr Lungu fired Denny Kalya-
lya, the governor of the central bank, and
replaced him with Christopher Mvunga, a
political ally. Mr Kalyalya was dismissed
partly because he rebuffed efforts to have
the central bank print money, according to
people familiar with the decision. Mr
Mvunga “does not have the power to resist”,
says a former senior central banker.
Zambia’s latest budget, passed on Sep-LUSAKA
Zambia is starting to look like the failure next doorZambiaSlouching towards Zimbabwe
Cliff-edge
Zambia, general government gross debt
% of GDPSource:IMF *Forecast1251007550250
20*1918171615141312112010