46 TheEconomistNovember 14th 2020
1T
he twocapitals erupted at roughly the
same time. On November 9th, known as
the national flag day in Azerbaijan, Baku
burst into jubilation. Crowds swarmed the
city and flocked to the Alley of Martyrs, a
memorial to fallen soldiers. They wrapped
themselves in Azerbaijani and Turkish
flags, sang the national anthem and
praised their victorious leader, Ilham Ali-
yev. On the same day in Yerevan, the capital
of Armenia, angry crowds stormed the par-
liament building, cursing Nikol Pashin-
yan, their prime minister.
The cause of both scenes was the an-
nouncement of a peace deal. Brokered by
Russia and Turkey, it ended a six-week war
over Nagorno-Karabakh. This is an enclave
in Azerbaijan, mostly populated by ethnic
Armenians but of cultural and historical
significance to both sides. A day earlier,
Azerbaijan had raised its flag over Shusha,
a strategic hilltop citadel inside Nagorno-
Karabakh and a cradle of Azerbaijani cul-
ture. Within hours Armenia’s exhausted
and demoralised forces surrendered, a hu-miliation for which Mr Pashinyan had
done nothing to prepare his country.
The peace deal marks one of the biggest
shake-ups in a turbulent region at the
crossroads of Europe, Asia and the Middle
East since the collapse of the Soviet empire,
which also began in Nagorno-Karabakh. In
February 1988 a few hundred Armenians
came out onto Lenin Square in Stepana-
kert, the enclave’s capital, demanding to be
united with Soviet Armenia. They started a
chain of events that catalysed the break-up
of the Soviet Union and later led to a two-
year war between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
That war ended with the victory of the
Armenians, partly because of Russian mil-
itary support. Armenia captured Nagorno-
Karabakh and occupied seven adjacent dis-
tricts that belonged to Azerbaijan. The con-
flict was (mostly) frozen but never
resolved, leaving Azerbaijan with a sense of
trauma and the border between Turkey and
Armenia shut.
On September 27th, after 25 years of
waiting for the return of its territory, Azer-baijan went back to war. It was aided by
Turkey, which provided drones and train-
ing. It recaptured most of its lost territory.
The war was all but inevitable. Azerbai-
jan, a petro-state, had grown richer, more
confident and more frustrated at the lack of
progress in talks with Armenia. However,
three other factors played a role.
One was the growing assertiveness of
Turkey. It has shown its willingness to use
force and provide military backing to Azer-
baijan, in the form of planners and Syrian
mercenaries.
The second was Russia acquiescing to
Azerbaijan’s advance and to Turkey’s in-
volvement. In the past Azerbaijan had been
afraid to launch an all-out offensive be-
cause of Russia’s commitment to defend
Armenia. But as Azerbaijan correctly
guessed, Vladimir Putin cared more about
his anti-Western alliance with Turkey and
was no longer inclined to side with Arme-
nia’s government after a largely peaceful
“colour” revolution in 2018 swept the popu-
list Mr Pashinyan to power. Russia’s presi-
dent does not recognise the legitimacy of
leaders brought to power by uprisings. Mr
Pashinyan further angered Mr Putin by im-
prisoning a friend of his, Robert Kocharian,
a former Armenian president. Mr Putin
was not allowed to see him during a visit to
Yerevan last year.
The third factor has been the gradual
disengagement of America from the re-
gion, which has accelerated under Presi-Nagorno-KarabakhPeace, for now
A bloody war ends in the CaucasusEurope
47 HobblinggraftbustersinUkraine
48 SharingEurope’srecoveryfund
48 Francefightsjihadistsinthe SahelAlso in this section— Charlemagne is away