The Economist - USA (2020-11-13)

The EconomistNovember 14th 2020 Europe 49

2 vance on Mali’s capital, Bamako. Today it
keeps 5,100 soldiers in the Sahel, as part of a
counter-terrorism mission called Opera-
tion Barkhane, which President Emmanuel
Macron this year reinforced. No other
European country contributes anything
like this number to military activities in
the Sahel, even to a parallel United Nations
peacekeeping operation. The unhas 13,600
soldiers, among them some 350 Germans,
soon to be joined by 250 British.
Most combat operations, though, fall to
the French-led forces. These campaigns,
amid the heat and billowing sand, are gru-
elling and risky. Last year, described by Mr
Macron as “cruel and painful”, was the re-
gion’s deadliest for years. The French lost 13
elite soldiers in a single night-time heli-
copter crash in the “three frontiers” zone
between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. The
French base in Gao, Barkhane’s biggest,
was attacked with a car-bomb. The armies
of Niger and Mali lost scores of soldiers in
terrorist attacks. Across the Sahel, an esti-
mated 4m people have fled their homes.
In January Mr Macron hosted a summit
in the French town of Pau with the leaders
of the five Sahel countries (Burkina Faso,
Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger). Amid
accusations of neo-colonialism, France’s
president partly sought confirmation from
regional leaders that they actually wanted
French troops to stay, which they gave. But
the idea was also to share out the security
burden, both by recruiting fellow Euro-
peans to help and getting regional armies
to do a better job themselves.

This has brought some successes. In

Ménaka and Gao, Estonian special forces

took part in operation Bourrasque along-

side French commandos, as part of a new

joint task-force, Takuba. They worked well

together, says an Estonian commando.

Czech and Swedish special forces are due to

arrive soon. Such forces, explains a French

commando, operate discreetly alongside

Malian regulars, so that villagers can see

their own country’s troops on the job. This

is part of a broader plan to improve local

confidence and security. The British and

Danes help to provide air-lift. During Bour-

rasque, French soldiers worked with units

from Niger and Mali, a form of on-the-job

training that went better than expected, a

French officer says.

Certainly the mood in Gao, where one

recent morning French officers could be

found in the canopied mess discussing Ni-

gerian and Malian novelists over crois-

sants, is more upbeat. General Marc Con-

ruyt, who commands Barkhane, declares

himself very satisfied with recent opera-

tions. The French sense they have dealt a

real blow to isgs. “They certainly haven’t

disappeared,” says the general. “But they

don’t have the same capacity to cause trou-

ble in this zone that they did at the end of

2019.” The French now consider rival

groups affiliated to al-Qaeda to be the

greater threat. On October 30th Barkhane

killed at least 50 jihadists linked to al-

Qaeda in an assault on a night-time convoy.

For all these encouraging signs, how-

ever, the French are stuck in an unwinna-

ble war. On motorbikes and pick-up trucks,

insurgents are mobile and nomadic. They

support themselves by trafficking guns and

drugs, and have a talent for disappearing

into the bush. Across the north of Mali,

they still hold sway. Tactical successes in

one zone can push jihadists into another.

The operational aim, says General Conruyt,

is to harass and weaken them so as to “tip

the balance in favour of our allies”. France,

suggests Michael Shurkin of rand, a think-

tank in Washington, in a recent paper,

“does not aspire to...defeat the jihadists.”

Rocky local politics do not help. As it is,

Sahelian armies have themselves been ac-

cused of atrocities, which can help jiha-

dists recruit. In August Malian officers

ousted the president in a coup. The new

leaders have promised elections, and say

they want France to stay, even if its mission

is unpopular. But they dismayed French

observers by freeing 200 jihadists as part of

a hostage-liberation deal last month. The

new rulers now want to negotiate with

armed jihadist groups. France disapproves.

Ms Parly stresses that “France is no lon-

ger alone.” Yet the Sahel is nobody else’s

priority, despite France’s efforts to per-

suade its friends that the region’s stability

directly affects Europe’s. The French will

not be thanked for staying, but nor would

they be for packing up. Under Joe Biden,

America will still be under pressure to

withdraw personnel from Africa. “The bot-

tom line is that the French are actually out

there on the ground,” says Charles Kup-

chan of the Council on Foreign Relations in

Washington. “When the usis looking to

lighten the load, having a partner ready to

step up to the plate is a big deal.”

Next month Mr Macron, who has now

put soldiers on anti-terrorist patrol on the

streets in France, will take stock. He could

decide to bring some troops home. “The

objective”, says Ms Parly, “is progressively

to be more in a support role than on the

front line.” But for now, like it or not, France

is stuck there. As Ms Parly says, “This is a

Gruelling and risky long-term job.” 7

NIGER

NIGERIA

ALGERIA

CAMEROON

MALI

MAURITANIA

BURKINA FASO

Bamako

Gao Ménaka

Liptako

region

S A H E L CHAD*

500 km

SAHEL

OperationBarkhane

Bases

Sources:ACLED;Menastream;

FrenchMinistryofDefence

*Twotemporarybases

inChadnotshown

Permanent

Temporary

Violent events involving

jihadist groups, 2020

To Oct 30th