Times 2 - UK (2020-11-16)

(Antfer) #1

2 1GT Monday November 16 2020 | the times


times2Obama in his own words


that way. Fighting terrorists — “on
their ten-yard line and not ours” as
[Robert] Gates liked to put it — had
provided the entire rationale behind
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. But
as al-Qaeda had scattered and gone
underground, metastasizing into a
complex web of affiliates, operatives,
sleeper cells, and sympathizers
connected by the internet and burner
phones, our national security agencies
had been challenged to construct new
forms of more targeted, nontraditional
warfare — including operating an
arsenal of lethal drones to take out al-
Qaeda operatives within the territory
of Pakistan. The National Security
Agency, or NSA, already the most
sophisticated electronic-intelligence-
gathering organization in the world,

employed new supercomputers and
decryption technology worth billions
of dollars to comb cyberspace in
search of terrorist communications
and potential threats. The Pentagon’s
Joint Special Operations Command,
anchored by Navy SEAL teams and
Army Special Forces, carried out
nighttime raids and hunted down
terrorist suspects mostly inside — but
sometimes outside — the war zones
of Afghanistan and Iraq. And the CIA
developed new forms of analysis and
intelligence gathering.
The White House, too, had
reorganized itself to manage
the terrorist threat. Each month,
I chaired a meeting in the Situation
Room, bringing all the intelligence
agencies together to review recent

O


UR ENTIRE
NATIONAL
SECURITY TEAM
spent the next
four days absorbed
by the drama
unfolding on the
open seas off
Somalia. The quick-thinking crew of
the cargo-carrying Maersk Alabama
had managed to disable the ship’s
engine before the pirates boarded, and
most of its members had hidden in a
secure room. Their American captain,
a courageous and levelheaded
Vermonter named Richard Phillips,
meanwhile, had stayed on the bridge.
With the 508-foot ship inoperable and
their small skiff no longer seaworthy,
the Somalis decided to flee on a
covered lifeboat, taking Phillips
as a hostage and demanding a
$2 million ransom. Even as one
of the hostage-takers surrendered,
negotiations to release the American
captain went nowhere. The drama
only heightened when Phillips
attempted escape by jumping
overboard, only to be recaptured.
With the situation growing more
tense by the hour, I issued a standing
order to fire on the Somali pirates if at
any point Phillips appeared to be in
imminent danger. Finally, on the fifth
day, we got the word: In the middle of
the night, as two of the Somalis came
out into the open and the other could be
seen through a small window holding a
gun to the American captain, Navy
SEAL snipers took three shots. The
pirates were killed. Phillips was safe.

The news elicited high fives all
around the White House. The
Washington Post headline declared it
AN EARLY MILITARY VICTORY
FOR OBAMA. But as relieved as I was
to see Captain Phillips reunited with
his family, and as proud as I was of our
navy personnel for their handling of
the situation, I wasn’t inclined to beat
my chest over the episode. Partly, it
was a simple recognition that the line
between success and complete disaster
had been a matter of inches — three
bullets finding their targets through
the darkness rather than being thrown
off just a tad by a sudden ocean swell.
But I also realized that around the
world, in places like Yemen and
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, the
lives of millions of young men like
those three dead Somalis (some of
them boys, really, since the oldest
pirate was believed to be nineteen)
had been warped and stunted by
desperation, ignorance, dreams of
religious glory, the violence of their
surroundings, or the schemes of older
men. They were dangerous, these
young men, often deliberately and
casually cruel. Still, in the aggregate, at
least, I wanted somehow to save them
— send them to school, give them a
trade, drain them of the hate that had
been filling their heads. And yet the
world they were a part of, and the
machinery I commanded, more often
had me killing them instead.

THAT PART OF my job involved
ordering people to be killed wasn’t a
surprise, although it was rarely framed

The line


between


success


and


complete


disaster


had been


a matter


of inches


Ordering a kill,


battling al-Qaeda


and dining in


the desert with


Saudi royalty


Entering the White House in 2009, Barack Obama


was determined that his counterterrorism strategy


would be effective — but humane. Here he


describes how he set about breaking with the past


Extract from the former President’s new book

Free download pdf