CHAPTER XVII
THE WILL
The fundamental fact in all ranges of life from the lowest to the highest is
activity, doing. Every individual, either animal or man, is constantly meeting
situations which demand response. In the lower forms of life, this response is
very simple, while in the higher forms, and especially in man, it is very complex.
The bird sees a nook favorable for a nest, and at once appropriates it; a man sees
a house that strikes his fancy, and works and plans and saves for months to
secure money with which to buy it. It is evident that the larger the possible
number of responses, and the greater their diversity and complexity, the more
difficult it will be to select and compel the right response to any given situation.
Man therefore needs some special power of control over his acts—he requires a
will.
1. THE NATURE OF THE WILL
There has been much discussion and not a little controversy as to the true nature
of the will. Just what is the will, and what is the content of our mental stream
when we are in the act of willing? Is there at such times a new and distinctly
different content which we do not find in our processes of knowledge or emotion
—such as perception, memory, judgment, interest, desire? Or do we find, when
we are engaged in an act of the will, that the mental stream contains only the
familiar old elements of attention, perception, judgment, desire, purpose, etc., all
organized or set for the purpose of accomplishing or preventing some act?
The Content of the Will.—We shall not attempt here to settle the controversy
suggested by the foregoing questions, nor, for immediately practical purposes,
do we need to settle it. It is perhaps safe to say, however, that whenever we are
willing the mental content consists of elements of cognition and feeling plus a
distinct sense of effort, with which everyone is familiar. Whether this sense of
effort is a new and different element, or only a complex of old and familiar
mental processes, we need not now decide.