important ones of which may now briefly be described after the general plan
suggested by Professor James:
The Reasonable Type.—One of the simplest types of decision is that in which
the preponderance of motives is clearly seen to be on one side or the other, and
the only rational thing to do is to decide in accordance with the weight of
evidence. Decisions of this type are called reasonable. If we discover ten reasons
why we should pursue a certain course of action, and only one or two reasons of
equal weight why we should not, then the decision ought not to be hard to make.
The points to watch in this case are (a) that we have really discovered all the
important reasons on both sides of the case, and (b) that our feelings of personal
interest or prejudice have not given some of the motives an undue weight in our
scale of values.
Accidental type: External Motives.—It is to be doubted whether as many of
our decisions are made under immediate stress of volition as we think. We may
be hesitating between two sets of motives, unable to decide between them, when
a third factor enters which is not really related to the question at all, but which
finally dictates the decision nevertheless. For example, we are considering the
question whether we shall go on an excursion or stay at home and complete a
piece of work. The benefits coming from the recreation, and the pleasures of the
trip, are pitted against the expense which must be incurred and the desirability of
having the work done on time. At this point, while as yet we have been unable to
decide, a friend comes along, and we seek to evade the responsibility of making
our own decision by appealing to him, "You tell me what to do!" How few of us
have never said in effect if not in words, "I will do this or that if you will"! How
few have never taken advantage of a rainy day to stay from church or shirk an
undesirable engagement! How few have not allowed important questions to be
decided by some trivial or accidental factor not really related to the choice in the
least!
This form of decision is accidental decision. It does not rest on motives which
are vitally related to the case, but rather on the accident of external
circumstances. The person who habitually makes his decisions in this way lacks
power of will. He does not hold himself to the question until he has gathered the
evidence before him, and then himself direct his attention to the best line of
action and so secure its performance. He drifts with the tide, he goes with the
crowd, he shirks responsibility.
Accidental Type: Subjective Motives.—A second type of accidental decision