THENEWYORKER,NOVEMBER23, 2020 43
“Babyproof this table!”
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prevail is not always the narrative that
does. At pivotal moments, such as after
a police shooting or during an attempted
authoritarian power grab, organizers may
find themselves facing a paradox. If no-
body mobilizes in response to egregious
abuses by the state, the abuses may ap-
pear to go unanswered. If people do mo-
bilize, and if a tiny minority of protesters
initiate violence, then that violence can
be used, cynically or otherwise, to cast the
movement as illegitimate, making it more
likely to lose. There is no consensus, ei-
ther among academics or among activ-
ists, on what constitutes violence—some
disavow property damage, others argue
that a few smashed windows can some-
times help the cause. Under normal cir-
cumstances, an image of a protester throw-
ing a rock could go viral, prompting a
negative press cycle. In a volatile post-
election moment, a single violent inci-
dent might give a flailing autocrat a pre-
text to ramp up repression by police, or
even to declare emergency powers. Shortly
after the 2020 election, as armed militias,
white nationalists, and other Trump sup-
porters planned a march in Washington,
D.C., Lakey’s group, Choose Democracy,
wrote an e-mail to its network of volun-
teers.“We don’t believe this is the mo-
ment for activation in the streets,” it read.
“Let’s keep breathing, staying attentive,
and be ready for action if things escalate.”
NAVCO 1.0 counted three hundred
and twenty-three maximalist campaigns
that occurred up to 2006. The list has
been updated continually since then,
and now comprises six hundred and
twenty-seven examples—including, for
the first time, an American campaign.
In the prepublication copy of “Civil Re-
sistance: What Everyone Needs to Know”
that I received in October, the campaigns
were laid out chronologically in a table
at the back of the book. Appearing shortly
after “Anti-Gnassingbé,” a campaign in
Togo, and shortly before the “Yellow
Vests,” a movement in France, was the
“Anti-Trump resistance.” Under “Pri-
mary method,” it was coded as nonvio-
lent. Under “Outcome,” instead of “suc-
cess” or “failure,” was the word “ongoing.”
I
n September, 2017, Merriman, of the
I.C.N.C., wrote a blog post recom-
mending more investment in what he
called “democracy insurance.” Just as
American taxpayers keep the Federal
Emergency Management Agency staffed
in case of natural disaster, he argued,
so should nongovernmental organiza-
tions in free societies fund “civil resis-
tance capacity” in case of a lurch toward
authoritarianism. This argument was
impossible to separate from Merriman’s
interests—he was, after all, the presi-
dent of an organization that specialized
in building such capacity—but it was
also substantiated by robust evidence.
In his blog post, Merriman wrote that
“democracies in many countries are
backsliding, such as in Hungary, Poland,
the Philippines, South Africa, and the
United States.” He wanted to insure
that, should this backsliding continue,
the people would be ready to mobilize.
In late May, a video of Derek Chau-
vin kneeling on George Floyd’s neck
set off a wave of protests around the
country. On June 1st, near the White
House, federal agents pepper-sprayed
peaceful protesters, clearing the way for
President Trump to pose for a photo
op; a few weeks later, federal agents drove
through Portland, Oregon, in unmarked
vans, snatching protesters off the streets
without warning. It seemed that the
slide toward autocracy was rapidly ac-
celerating. Merriman, who lives in a
suburb of Washington, D.C., expressed
his concerns to Romanow, who intro-
duced him to three activists who spe-
cialize in digital organizing: Ankur
Asthana, in Hoboken, New Jersey;
Marium Navid, in Los Angeles; and
Kifah Shah, in New York City. “Hardy
has been immersed in civil-resistance
theory for years,” Shah said. “Marium,
Ankur, and I know how to get that in-
formation out to people and train them
on how to use it.”
The four activists met on Zoom
throughout July and August, whenever
all of them could spare time from their
day jobs. By the end of August, they
had put together a fifty-five-page doc-
ument called “Hold the Line: A Guide
to Defending Democracy.” The guide
established a few “red lines” (“Trump
may declare victory even if the election
day results are ambiguous”) and pro-
posed some collective responses in the
event that those lines were crossed—a
combination of standard methods, such
as calling elected officials to ask that
they respect the democratic process, and
Sharpian methods, such as boycotts and
civil disobedience. One section, writ-
ten primarily by Merriman, was a crash
course in the consent theory of power
which cited several experts in the field,
including Chenoweth and Stephan. The
rest of the guide was studded with work-
sheets and sample meeting agendas.
(The title page included a disclaimer:
“The views expressed here are solely
