The Economist - USA (2020-11-21)

The EconomistNovember 21st 2020 Leaders 11

1

2 Though they do not hold a single city, they are unchallenged in
the countryside and have a grip on the roads, on which they raise
taxes rather efficiently (see Asia section). The government in Ka-
bul, by contrast, is riddled with corruption and infighting. The
militants will not be defeated, so they will have to be negotiated
with. The deal struck by America’s envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, was
a necessary step towards ending the war.
Yet in his actions now, Mr Trump risks giving the militants far
more than they would otherwise be able to claim. In the run-up
to the American election, the president promised to bring all
American troops home “by Christmas”. On November 9th, after
losing the election, he followed up by dismissing Mark Esper, his
defence secretary, as well as several other Pentagon officials. The
acting defence secretary, Christopher Miller, seems keener to
satisfy his boss’s demands. On November 17th he announced
plans to reduce troop levels from 4,500 to 2,500 by mid-January.
That will let Mr Trump say he has kept his promise, but it sig-
nals to the Taliban that America is leaving no matter what. It un-
dermines the talks in Doha and heightens the risk that the Af-
ghan army will collapse. Already deprived of much American air
support, its forces are deeply demoralised. In the attack on Lash-
kar Gah hundreds fled without firing a shot. More defeats could
lead to much of America’s expensive gear falling into the hands
of the enemy, who would use it to press on farther. Plenty already
has: the Taliban show off Humvees in videos shared on social
media. Instead of making peace, America would have surren-

dered. Afghanistan might once again become a rogue state and,

one day, a terrorist haven.

Joe Biden, the president-elect, will inherit this poisoned chal-

ice. He has never been an enthusiast for intervention in Afghani-

stan. He, too, promises an end to “forever wars”. As vice-presi-

dent he opposed Barack Obama’s “surge”, which increased the

number of troops in the country to over 100,000. But that does

not mean he needs to hand victory to the Taliban.

On taking office he should announce that he will uphold the

deal with the Taliban—as long as they do. It calls for American

troops to leave by June of next year. Mr Biden should tell the Tali-

ban that this is conditional on their reducing violence and taking

the talks seriously. If they do not, American troops should stay.

Mr Biden should also make it clear to the government in Kabul

that it must negotiate in earnest.

Jens Stoltenberg, nato’s secretary-general, warns that the

price of leaving Afghanistan too soon “could be very high”. By

contrast, the cost of staying is low. No American soldier has been

killed in combat in Afghanistan since February. A few thousand

personnel is a tiny force. And yet it allows other allied countries,

such as Britain and Germany, to stay and train the Afghan army.

As long as some troops—and planes—remain, the Taliban’s

chance of seizing cities is limited. That gives the Afghan govern-

ment the opportunity to negotiate a genuine peace. America

should not allow the war to drag on for ever, but neither should it

jeopardise all that it has fought so hard to achieve. 7

W

ith debtslooming and dollars scarce, Zambia has wres-

tled in recent months with a predicament. It knew that

failing to pay bondholders would be damaging. But paying only

them, having failed to pay others in full, could be worse. Other

creditors would “blow off my legs”, the country’s finance minis-

ter said. So on November 13th Zambia became the sixth govern-

ment to default on its bonds this year—after Argentina, Belize,

Ecuador, Lebanon and Suriname. Others may follow. Although

financial markets have regained much of the composure they

lost in March, many countries still have more

debt than they can comfortably handle. Thirty-

eight governments have a credit rating that de-

notes a “material” risk of default or worse, twice

the number at the end of 2009.

The debts of poor countries would be less

daunting if they were not such a tangle of com-

peting claims. The 73 poorest owe almost a fifth

($102bn) of their foreign debt to private credi-

tors, from bondholders to banks, a similar amount to China,

$76bn to other governments and the rest to multilateral lenders

like the World Bank (see Finance section). And that is just the

stuff that international institutions can count. Crafting equita-

ble debt-relief deals from such a hotch-potch is difficult. Three

changes in particular would help: a more joined-up approach by

government lenders, tougher legislation to curb awkward priv-

ate creditors, and greater use of flexible instruments that align

repayment more closely with a borrower’s circumstances.

Any debt debacle pits the interests of borrowers against those

of lenders, but also pits lenders against each other. One creditor

may be forgiving. But that allows others to free-ride on its gener-

osity and collect payment in full. Thus every creditor wants to be

sure others are doing their bit. In Zambia’s case Chinese lenders

(which have agreed to defer some payments) and private bond-

holders (which have not) blame each other for the impasse.

To make sure each of them is doing their fair share, most rich-

country governments offer debt relief jointly through the Paris

Club, a grouping of government lenders. Ameri-

ca has long urged China to join. And at a summit

on November 21st-22nd, China will do the next

best thing. Along with the rest of the g20group

of big economies, it will sign off on a “common

framework” for relieving the debts of the world’s

73 poorest countries, if they prove impossible to

bear. The framework is limited in scope. It will

apply only to countries that request help, fess up

to their full liabilities, submit to imf-style policy prescriptions

and show that they cannot sustain their debts. It won’t, in other

words, deliver quick, unconditional debt relief to all poor coun-

tries, regardless of their need or demand for it. The framework

requires all official creditors to do their share. It also obliges the

borrowing country to seek similar help from private lenders.

The framework is a welcome step. The g20should now con-

sider some extensions. The same principles should also apply to

other emerging markets, beyond the 73 poorest. The framework

A better way not to pay

The g20’s new debt-relief framework is welcome. But it could still be improved on

Sovereign debt

General government grossdebt

%ofGDP

70

50

30

2012 15 20 25

Low-income countries

Emerging economies

FORECAST