The EconomistNovember 21st 2020 China 392
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evenyearsagoSusanRice,thenBarack
Obama’snationalsecurityadviser,said
Americawanted“a newmodelof major
power relations”withChina. Herwords
echoeda termusedbyChina’spresident,Xi
Jinping—“anewtypeofgreat-powerrela-
tions”—todescribewhathehopedwould
bea moreaccommodatingAmericanview
ofhiscountry.Withina yearMsRice(pic-
tured,withJoeBiden)andherbossstopped
usingthephraseasitbecameevermore
clearthatMrXihadnoplanstobeaccom-
modatinghimself.NowMsRiceandher
thendeputy,AntonyBlinken,areamong
leadingcontenderstobecomesecretaryof
stateunderJoeBiden,America’snextpresi-
dent.SomeofMrObama’smosttrustedad-
visersonChinaarelookingforwardtoa
secondchance.Thistimetheyhavefew,if
any,illusionsaboutChina’sstrongman.
Asthepresident-electselectspeoplefor
hisnational-securityteamandotherkey
China-relatedjobs, hewilldrawheavily
from MrObama’s formerstaff. Most of
thoselikelytobechosencomefroma tradi-
tionalschoolofforeignpolicythatplaces
trustinalliances,treatiesandmultilateral
institutions.Theirbreedisverydifferent
fromthatofMrTrump’sChinateam.
FearsthatRepublicansmayretaincon-
troloftheSenate(tobedecidedinJanuary
bytwospecialelectionsinGeorgia)could
dimMsRice’sprospects.Sheiswidelydis-
likedamongRepublicans.Someofthem
seeheraspartlytoblameforwhatthey
viewasthefailingsofMrObama’sChina
policy.RepublicanChinahawkswouldbe
happiertoseethejobgotoMrBlinken,a
genial,well-likedlongtimeaidetoMrBi-
den.Anothercandidatelesscontroversial
thanMsRiceisChristopherCoons,a cen-tristDemocraticsenatorfromMrBiden’s
homestateofDelaware.
AdviserstoMrBidensaythattheviews
onChinaof allthreeof thesepotential
choicesforsecretaryof statehavehard-
enedinthepasttwoyears,ashavethoseof
mostothermembersofWashington’sfor-
eign-policy establishment. Last year Ms
Rice spoketough about Huawei,urging
Canadatokeepthetelecomsgiantoutofits
5 gnetworks.MrBlinkenhassaidthatsome
assumptionsaboutengagementwithChi-
nahaveturnedouttobewrong.Buthehas
alsosaidthat,asa believerininternational
agreementslikearmscontrolandclimate
treaties,thereisscopeforco-operation.If Mr Blinken does not get the job at the
State Department, he would probably serve
as national security adviser, a White House
role that would suit him well given his
close work with Mr Biden over the years. It
is also possible that Ms Rice may be offered
the national-security role as a consolation,
because it does not require Senate approv-
al. It is unclear whether she would be will-
ing to take a post that she has already held.
Obama veterans are sure to get other se-
nior jobs. Michèle Flournoy, an under-
secretary of defence under Mr Obama, is
likely to lead the Pentagon. In an article in
June in Foreign Affairs she said America
needed to do more to deter China, such as
by beefing up military capability and send-
ing clear signals of American support for
regional allies. Ely Ratner, one of the most
respected China hawks in the Democratic
ranks, may serve Ms Flournoy as an assis-
tant secretary.
For the post of treasury secretary Lael
Brainard, a member of the Federal Re-
serve’s board of governors and a former
undersecretary at the Treasury Depart-
ment, is a front-runner (see Free ex-
change). A former Obama official describes
her as a “silent hawk” on China. (Her hus-
band, Kurt Campbell, helped guide China
policy as assistant secretary of state for
East Asia during Mr Obama’s first term.)
A department that has become increas-
ingly influential on China is Commerce,
which oversees export controls and an “en-
tity list” of blacklisted companies—tools
that the Trump administration has em-
ployed with gusto against Chinese tech
firms. Some tech-industry leaders, eyeing
the market in China, want someone to lead
the department who will loosen the screws
a bit. Meg Whitman, a former ceoof Hew-
lett Packard Enterprise, a giant tech firm
with dealings in China, is one of several ru-
moured candidates who would please Sili-
con Valley titans. Kevin Wolf, who worked
on export controls under Mr Obama and is
seen (by China hawks, at least) as friendly
to the tech industry, has been mentioned as
a contender for another powerful role at
Commerce: head of the Bureau of Industry
and Security. Those who fill these posts
may have as much impact on China policy
as other senior appointees.
It is far less certain who will fill lower-
profile positions. But these can also be cru-
cial in shaping China policy. Matthew Pot-
tinger, Mr Trump’s deputy national securi-
ty adviser, started in 2017 as senior director
for Asia, a couple of rungs below Ms Rice’s
old job. Mr Pottinger played a big part in
steering the administration’s hard turn on
the Communist Party. His successor in the
Asia role could be someone like Mr Ratner
(if he does not serve at the Pentagon). The
choice will necessarily come later than the
selection of principals in the national-se-
curity team. But it could matter a lot. 7NEWYORK
VeteransoftheObamaadministrationwillshapeJoeBiden’sChinapolicy.
TheyarefarlesssanguineaboutChina’srisethantheyusedtobeThenextChinateamSecond-chancesaloon
No more need to whisper about Chinaintends to stand firm against China. Advis-
ers suggest that he wait longer than usual
to take a congratulatory call from Mr Xi,
and not fall for any language Mr Xi may use
to suggest a new framework for the rela-
tionship. Initially, at least, Mr Biden will fo-
cus on domestic issues like covid-19 and
the economy, as well as on strengthening
ties with allies. He will want their support
when he turns his attention China-wards.
Mr Xi will surely look for a chance to test
Mr Biden’s mettle. In the build-up to a cru-
cial Communist Party gathering in 2022, he
will not wish to appear weak. How Mr Bi-
den responds to any provocation will de-pend, in part, on the advice he receives
from his senior officials. Some of those
whom he is expected to pick as his nation-
al-security advisers are veterans of the
Obama administration who shied away
from confrontation with China. Others be-
lieve in more muscular responses to its in-
creasingly assertive behaviour, including a
clearer commitment by America to defend
Taiwan against any Chinese attack. As vice-
president Mr Biden displayed caution
about the use of American force. In his
dealings with China, the risk of a dysfunc-
tional relationship turning into a violent
one will loom large in his calculations. 7