46 Europe The EconomistNovember 28th 2020
2“L
ove,loveinZakopane.We’reshow-
eringourselvesinchampagne.I am
theknight,andyou,queenofthenight.”
Thebaldingsingerwitha stubbymous-
tacheandsequinedblazerslidacrossthe
stage.It wasa chillyNewYear’sEvein
2018,butthecrowdof60,000sangalong
intheresorttownofZakopaneinthe
foothillsoftheTatramountains.Another
8mPoleswatchedthepublicbroadcast-
er’sflagshipconcertfromhome,triple
thepeakviewingfiguresofitsrivaltele-
visionstations.
Discopolo,a musicalgenreonce
relegatedtocountryweddingband-
stands,hasstruttedontothemainstage.
CreatedinruralPolandinthelate1980s,
it blendsfolktuneswithdrummachines
andsynthesisers,oftenwithsaucylyrics.
“PolkaDotKnickers”,a hitsongin1995,
offendedmanysensibilities.Butthe
genrehasbouncedback.Almosttwo-thirdsofPoles—and80%oftheminrural
areas—saytheyenjoyit.“LoveinZako-
pane”hashad226mviewsonYouTube.
Discopolobandsnowperformat
venuessuchasWarsaw’sPalaceofCul-
tureandScienceandLondon’so2 Arena.
InSeptembera schoolinMichalowo,in
easternPoland,launchedthecountry’s
firstclassaimedatmakinga careerin
discopolo.Thisyear’sinauguralclassof
27 highschoolersiscoachedinsinging
anddancing,andlearnsthetechnical-
itiesofsoundsystems.Theministerof
educationatthetimecommendedit:
“Maybeit’llcatchon.”Thetownisbuild-
inga disco-polomuseum.
Polishpoliticianshavelongsucked
uptodisco-polofans.Backinthepresi-
dentialcampaignof1995,thetwofront-
runnerswerebothbackedbydisco-polo
artists.Butthepatronageaffordedto
musiciansundertherulingLawand
Justice partyisquitenew.Earlierthis
yeartvp, Poland’spublicbroadcaster,
releaseda hagiographyofthedisco-polo
doyen,ZenekMartyniuk.Aftersinging
alongatoneofhisconcerts,thestation’s
boss,a LawandJusticepolitician,saidit
wastimetoend“thehypocrisyandpre-
tencethatthisisaninferiorgenre”.
Therulingpartyhasgoodreasonto
indulgediscopolo’senthusiasts—they
areitscoresupporters.Inlastyear’s
parliamentaryelectionsit gotroughly
twicethevote-shareinruralregions,the
heartlandofthesimpletunes,asit didin
bigcities.tvphasdenouncedanypoli-
ticiansorculturalguruswhosneerat
discopoloasoutoftouchwith“ordin-
ary”Poles.Afteritsrecord-breaking
viewingfiguresfortheNewYear’sEve
concertin 2019 starringMrMartyniuk,
thestationrana gloatingsegment:“The
pseudo-elitesarejealous.”Discopopulism
PolandWARSAW
Therulingpartypayshomagetoruralmusicdoes not yet add up to much. An alphabet
soup of embryonic security programmes
focuses on new co-operation mechanisms,
rather than step-changes in Europe’s abili-
ty to handle collective defence. Yet France
and Germany now agree that Europe must
do more. German defence spending,
though a smaller share of gdp than in
France, has been growing steadily since- A common eu military-strategy docu-
ment will be concluded under France’s eu
presidency in 2022. A new poll finds that
51% of Germans think Europe should grow
more independent of America. There is
deepening European co-operation in a
counter-terrorism operation in the Sahel,
albeit with American intelligence backing.
So why do France and Germany appear
to be talking past one another? Mr Macron
has neither called for America to withdraw
from Europe, nor suggested that natois
“superfluous”, as Ms Kramp-Karrenbauer
has hinted. He sees beefing up European
defence as a response to a pre-Trump
American pivot to Asia, and stresses that it
should be “complementary” to nato. In
Germany the deeper divide is not between
pro-natoAtlanticists and pro-Europeans;
but between those, like Ms Kramp-Karren-
bauer, who encourage difficult domestic
conversations about defence spending and
military capabilities, and those who would
prefer to ignore the subject. If Mr Macron
worries that a Biden administration will
induce the German establishment back
into deep strategic sleep, Ms Kramp-Kar-
renbauer ought to be among his closest al-
lies in Berlin, not the subject of his barbs.
The difficulty may stem partly from lan-
guage. Mr Macron uses “European sover-
eignty” and “strategic autonomy” almost
interchangeably, sometimes to cover
broader industrial and technological inde-
pendence. Yet full defence sovereignty
means a great deal more than merely Eu-
rope’s ability to act autonomously, for ex-
ample to resolve a limited regional crisis.
As Mr Macron pointed out in a speech to
the Bundestag in 2018: “In France, ‘sover-
eignty’ is a common term; in Germany I
know it can cause surprise, even fear.”
Many Germans also resist Mr Macron’s em-
phasis on “strategic autonomy”, preferring
to talk about the “European pillar of nato”
in order to avoid ambiguity about Ameri-
ca’s security role in Europe.
There is also old distrust in Berlin (and
elsewhere in the eu) about French inten-
tions. Some officials see in Mr Macron an
old-style Gaullist wrapping French inter-
ests in a European flag. They suspect him of
seeking to undermine natoand substitute
French leadership in Europe for American
influence. Others appreciate Mr Macron’s
energy but find his unilateralism exhaust-
ing—and sometimes counter-productive,
as in Libya or the eastern Mediterranean.
Above all, the gulf between the two
countries’ defence cultures is just extreme-
ly hard to bridge. Defence, says Claudia Ma-
jor of the German Institute for Internation-
al and Security Affairs, remains the
“problem child”. France has a tradition of
military intervention and the use of expe-
ditionary force (and boasts nuclear weap-
ons); Germany’s culture of military re-
straint is as strong as ever, and politicians
struggle to articulate a national strategic
interest. Where France instinctively sees
threats to Europe’s south, Germans look
eastward—and take seriously scepticism
towards Mr Macron from eastern Euro-
peans who balk at any hint of weakeningtransatlantic security ties. The defence
minister of Poland has intervened in the
spat to say he agrees with the Germans (as
has Spain’s prime minister).
If Europeans accept the need to “do
more” for their own defence, they have yet
to agree on what this means. The idea of
partial defence autonomy commands wide
and growing support, but not when cou-
pled with the more ambitious and pricey
idea of total sovereignty in defence. In-
stead of a war of words, Europeans must
work out what capabilities they need and
when, and how to pay for them—no matter
who is president in America. 7