A History of the American People

patriots. How could he possibly know? He had never set foot in America. And it never occurred
to him to go there and see for himself what needed to be done, or whether an honorable
compromise could be negotiated. No member of the government ever thought of crossing the
Atlantic on a fact-finding mission. At various times, generals were given powers to treat, but
only after the rebels had agreed to lay down their arms. What good was that? In fact the generals
were frequently changed, a sure sign of mismanagement. First Gage came and went, then
Admiral Richard Howe and his brother General William Howe shared a joint command-an
absurd arrangement-then General Burgoyne and Marquis Cornwallis were given separate and
unrelated armies-another absurdity-both of which they lost. Far from getting the chance to
negotiate after a rebel surrender, the British generals in fact were instructed to make concessions
only after they were involved in disasters-exactly the other way round. Much of the fault for
these egregious errors lay with George III, a man who had never seen a shot fired in anger, who
had never been abroadand who never even saw the sea until he was an old man.
The British commanders were not starved of manpower. Some 30,000 mercenaries were sent
out. But this was probably counterproductive, since their conduct outraged even the Tory
loyalists. When the two Howes were operating in New York in 1776, they had no fewer than
seventy-three warships, manned by 13,000 seamen, and transports loaded with 32,000 troops.
That was a big expedition by British standards. But none of the large resources Britain put into
the war produced long-term results, or indeed any at all. It might have been different if George
III or North had picked one really first-class general, and given him unlimited military and
political authority, on the spot. But such a person would almost certainly have concluded that the
war was folly, and negotiated an end to it. As it was, all the generals (not the admirals) were
second-rate, and it showed.
The course of the war is soon told. The first winter 1775-6, when the conflict was concentrated
around Boston, was inconclusive and enabled Washington to organize his army. The Howes'
strategy in New York in 1776 was to take the city, cut off New England from the south, then
destroy the rebellion at its heart, in Massachusetts. To frustrate this, Washington ferried his army
from Manhattan to Brooklyn and dug in on the Heights. Howe outflanked him and Washington
lost 1,500 men to Howe's 400. Washington was lucky to get 9,000 men back to Manhattan. But
Howe failed to surround the American army and destroy it, and Washington escaped to New
Jersey and across the Delaware. These were the times that `tried men's souls,' as Tom Paine
wrote in his topical tract, The Crisis. In fact, Washington fought a successful winter campaign,
killing or capturing 1,000 German mercenaries at Trenton, defeating the garrison at Princeton,
then retiring in good order to Morristown in late January 1777. Howe now moved south,
descending on Philadelphia, and beating Washington at Brandywine on September 11, 1777.
Meanwhile General John Burgoyne, commanding in Canada, had defeated a second American
army, under Richard Montgomery, which had moved north in the hope of raising allies along the
St Lawrence. But the Canadians, whether British-descended Protestants or French-descended
Catholics, were not interested. They had got a good deal from Britain in 1774 and they remained
loyal, now and later. So Burgoyne was able to move onto the offensive. But he was a rash man.
In June 1777 he shipped 7,000 men, British, loyalists, Indians and Brunswickers, across Lake
Champlain and then down the Hudson. The aim should have been to catch Washington in a
pincer with Burgoyne forming one arm and Howe the other. But no such plan was concocted.
Instead, Burgoyne soon got into difficulties. He lost two minor actions on September 19 and
October 7, then found himself surrounded and surrendered at Saratoga on October 17, 1777. That
led to the first genuine British offer of terms-turned down, naturally. Washington's army