460 Chapter 24
its legitimate ruler, and the people of each province
should be restored to their place in the legitimate (Old
Regime) social order.
In theory, the doctrine of legitimacy meant the
recreation of pre-1789 frontiers, monarchies, and social
systems—the divinely ordained order. In reality, the de-
cisions made at Vienna stemmed from self-interest (see
map 24.1). Compensation was a truer name for the phi-
losophy of the congress, and the four allies each an-
nexed territory without a pretense of legitimacy. Whole
regions of Europe—such as Belgium, Genoa, Lom-
bardy, Norway, Poland, and Saxony—became the
pawns of the great powers. Russia kept Finland (which
it had annexed during the war) and gained most of
Poland. The Russian concession to legitimacy was to
give “Congress Poland” its own constitution. Prussia an-
nexed half of neighboring Saxony and several small
states in the Rhineland. This changed the course of
European history because an enlarged Prussia acquired
great industrial potential and a presence in western
Europe.
Britain and Austria demanded compensation to bal-
ance the gains of the Prussians and Russians. This led to
a two-against-two stalemate until the four powers asked
a fifth diplomat to join them—Louis XVIII’s foreign
minister, Prince Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand.
Talleyrand had served the Old Regime as a bishop, the
French Revolution as a legislator, and Napoleon as a
diplomat, so he was comfortable when self-interest was
more important than principle. He supported Britain
and Austria, so they, too, received compensation. The
British took new colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Amer-
icas plus strategic islands, such as Malta; they also in-
sisted that a friendly state (but not a great power)
control the lowlands from which an invasion of En-
gland might be launched. Consequently, the predomi-
nantly Protestant, Dutch-speaking Netherlands
annexed the Catholic, predominantly French-speaking
region of Belgium. The Habsburgs had previously ruled
this region (then known as the Austrian Netherlands),
so Austria took compensation in northern Italy: Lom-
bardy and the Republic of Venice.
Even after their mutual aggrandizement, the great
powers did not follow the principle of legitimacy. They
did not resurrect the Holy Roman Empire, which had
confederated two hundred German states in central
DOCUMENT 24.1
Metternich: The Conservative’s Faith (1820)
Prince Klemens von Metternich (1773–1859) was the Austrian for-
eign minister for nearly half a century, from 1809 to 1848. He was the
most influential statesman in post-Napoleonic Europe, and he shaped
the peace treaties of 1815, the postwar alliance system, and the antilib-
eral domestic policies of the age. The following document, which he sent
to the emperors of Austria and Russia in 1820, explains his conserva-
tive values and his reasons for his policies.
Kings have to calculate the chances of their very existence
in the immediate future; passions are let loose and league
together to overthrow everything which society respects as
the basis of its existence: religion, public morality, laws, cus-
toms, rights, duties are all attacked, confounded, over-
thrown, or called in question. The great mass of people are
tranquil spectators of these attacks and revolutions.... It is
principally the middle class of society which this moral
gangrene has affected, and it is only among them that the
real heads of the party [of revolution] are found....
We are convinced that society can no longer be saved
without strong and vigorous resolutions on the part of the
Governments... in establishing the principle of stability,
[which] will in no wise exclude the development of what
is good, for stability is not immobility....
Union between the monarchs is the basis for the pol-
icy which must now be followed to save society from total
ruin... : Respect for all that is; liberty for every Govern-
ment to watch over the well-being of its own people; a
league of all Governments against all factions in all states;
contempt for the meaningless words which have become
the rallying cry of the factious;... refusal on the part of
every monarch to aid or succour partisans under any mask
whatever....
We are certainly not alone in questioning if society
can exist with the liberty of the press.... Let the mon-
archs in these troublous times be more than usually
cautious....
Metternich, Klemens von. Memoirs of Prince Metternich,5 vol., trans.
Mrs. Alexander Napier. New York: Scribner’s, 1880–1882.