Europe in an Age of Nationalism, 1848–70 501“The great issues of the day,” he said defiantly, “will not
be decided by speeches and the decisions of a parlia-
mentary majority—that was the mistake of 1848 and
1849—but by iron and blood” (see document 25.6).
These words stuck. Bismarck became “the Iron Chan-
cellor” and Germany became a land of “iron and blood”
instead of liberalism.
Bismarckian diplomacy and the Prussian army cre-
ated a kleindeutsch Germany between 1864 and 1870 (see
map 25.4). Bismarck first won the friendship of Czar
Alexander II of Russia by helping him during the Polish
revolution of 1863. He next positioned Prussia as the
defender of German nationalism by supporting the
confederation in a dispute with Denmark over two
duchies, Schleswig and Holstein, located at their com-
mon border. In a dispute over the inheritance of these
provinces, the German Confederation endorsed the
claim of a German prince and in July 1863 called for
the use of force against Denmark. Within a year Bis-
marck had produced an anti-Danish alliance with Aus-
tria and a war with Denmark. The Danes held out for
five months before surrendering Schleswig and Hol-
stein. Bismarck did not free the duchies; instead, he ne-
gotiated the Convention of Gastein (August 1865) by
which Holstein became Austrian and Schleswig, cut off
by Austrian territory, became Prussian. This difficult
situation soon provided the disputes that led to a war
between Austria and Prussia.
Bismarck prepared Prussia for a war with Austria by
the skillful diplomacy that made him the most renowned
statesman of the late nineteenth century. Two months af-
ter his treaty with Austria, Bismarck held anti-Austrian
negotiations with Napoleon III at Biarritz on the south-
western coast of France. Using vague assurances of fair
compensation to France (perhaps in Belgium, perhaps in
Luxembourg, perhaps on the Rhineland frontier), Bis-
marck won a promise of French neutrality in the event of
an Austro-Prussian War plus French help in making a
similar deal with Italy. The Biarritz agreement of Octo-
ber 1865 was followed by a Prusso-Italian alliance (April
1866); Italy would help Prussia in a war with Austria in
return for Venetia. Confident that he had secured the
sympathies of Russia, France, and Italy, Bismarck pro-
voked the Austrians into war, much as Napoleon III and
Cavour had done in 1859.
By June 1866 Austria and Prussia were fighting an
unexpectedly lopsided Seven Weeks’ War (see table
25.2). Moltke directed a Prussian army whose needle-
guns enabled them to fire five to seven times per
minute from crouching or lying positions; the Austrians
used muzzle-loading guns that required soldiers to re-
main standing while firing two or three rounds per
minute. Moltke had also learned the lessons of the
American Civil War on the use of railroads to mobilize
large armies. The first advantage meant that Austria suf-
fered four times as many casualties as Prussia; the sec-
ond enabled Moltke to move a fresh army into a
decisive battle at the Bohemian town of Königgrätz.
The Austrians, whose introduction to industrialized
warfare cost them more than twelve thousand men per
week, surrendered shortly after the battle of Königgrätz
(also known as the battle of Sadowa, for a neighboring
village). Europe had entered a new age of warfare. As
one military observer of the wars of German unification
put it, “The armies taking the field today differ from
those commanded by the Duke of Wellington [in
1815] as much as the latter differed from the Roman
legions.”
The stunning Prussian victory over Austria changed
the balance of power in Europe. By the Treaty of
Prague (August 1866), the Habsburg Empire gave
Venetia to Italy and acquiesced in a Prussian reshaping
of Germany. Franz Joseph had to swallow his own
Olmütz. The confederation, the last remnant of cen-
turies of Austrian hegemony in central Europe, wasDOCUMENT 25.6
Bismarck’s “Iron and Blood” Speech
on the Military Budget, 1862
Our blood is too hot; we prefer armor too heavy
for our slight body, but we should put it to use
nevertheless. The eyes of Germany are not fixed
on Prussia’s liberalism, but upon her power.
Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden may choose the
liberal path. No one for that reason will allot Prus-
sia’s role to them. Prussia must gather up her
strength and hold it in readiness for the favorable
moment—a moment which has already been let
pass on several occasions. Prussia’s borders under
the Treaty of Vienna are not suitable for a healthy
national life. The great questions of the day will
not be decided by speeches and the decisions of a
parliamentary majority—that was the mistake of
1848 and 1849—but by iron and blood.
Kohl, H., ed. “Die politischen Reden des Fursten Bismarck”
(Stuttgart, 1892). In Ludwig Schaefer et al., eds., Problems in
Western Civilization.New York: Scribner’s, 1965.