the place is so perfect (as they say) for piractical excursions that they will
ruin the trade of Your Majesty’s vessels, for that is the purpose of their
going [there].” After reviewing the government papers, the historian David
Beers Quinn concluded that the Spanish ambassador was right. As Quinn
wrote, “There is little doubt that a primary consideration in the plans of
Ralegh and Grenville was the creation of a strong military base at a reason-
able distance from Spanish Florida, but capable of protecting vessels
assembling for raids on the Indies and refitting after their return.”
Attacks were certainly expected. What to do about them was debated
by Spanish officials for years. Attempts were made to create or improve for-
tifications in the Caribbean and along the Florida coast: “Much money and
many men are required to keep that territory safe,” lamented the president
of the Council of the Indies in 1585. But Drake’s attack had shown that a
static land defense could never prevail against highly mobile seaborne
forces. The Caribbean was not the place to organize protection.
If not the Caribbean, where? First, the Spanish government issued
orders to find and destroy the “pirate base” at Roanoke, but the Spaniards
soon concluded that nothing they did against the English in North America
would ensure the security of their treasure fleet. Philip decided that he
must attack the sponsor of the terrorists, England itself. Thus the first
English landing on Roanoke was one of the actions that led Philip II to
launch the “invincible Armada” of 132 ships—mounting 3,165 cannon and
carrying 19,000 soldiers—which he sent to “shock and awe” England
in 1588.
After the first armada failed to subdue England, the Spaniards’ next
move came in Ireland. Even if the Irish could not defeat the English, the
Spanish government judged, they could distract or weaken England. The
Spaniards did not start the war, which had been going on for centuries, but
they tried to make it more equal and, for the English, less winnable. So
Spain sent yet another fleet to aid the Irish in 1597 and a third in 1601.
Like the first armada of 1588, they failed in fire and storm, but the sur-
vivors who made it ashore served as “advisers,” to use the modern
euphemism, teaching the Irish the use of cannon. Both sides fought with a
ferocity seldom equaled until the twentieth century. The English took no
prisoners among the Spaniards and determined upon a policy of genocide
76 THE BIRTH OF AMERICA