The fighting 185Into the Wilderness
In May 1864, the Federal army advanced
across the Rapidan river and ended a period
of six months during which that stream had,
almost without interruption, constituted the
military frontier between the United States
and the Confederate States. General Robert
E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia had spent
the winter spread across the rolling fields
beyond the right bank of the river in Orange
County, around Orange Court House and
Gordonsville and Verdiersville. General
George G. Meade's Federal Army of the
Potomac wintered in the piedmont
countryside north of the Rapidan, centered
on Culpeper Court House.
Southern troops by this time had begun
to suffer markedly for want of rations, both
in volume and in quality, at least in part
because the president of the key rail line in
central Virginia was an ante bellum
immigrant from the North who secretly
accepted pay from the Federal Secretary of
War. Northern troops enjoyed infinitely
better supplies. Their army also underwent a
profound change during this winter. Meade
remained its nominal commander, and
would occupy that role to the war's end. The
newly minted Commander-in-Chief of all
Federal armies, however, established his
headquarters next to Meade, leaving the
army commander consigned to a secondary
profile. Ulysses S. Grant had come east as the
hero of benchmark Federal triumphs at
Vicksburg and Chattanooga to be
commissioned into the newly created rank of
lieutenant-general. For the rest of the war,
Meade's army commonly appeared in the
press as 'Grant's army' because the
Commander-in-Chief was with it. Writing on
the war still uses that locution, and in fact it
will appear this way in most instances
through the rest of this book.
As spring hardened the roads in 1864,
'Grant's army' prepared to take the offensive
with a new-found determination imparted
by Grant himself. A reorganization
consolidated some of the familiar old corps
out of existence, leaving only the II, V, and
VI Corps. General Ambrose E. Burnside's
IX Corps also marched with the army. The
once-disgraced Burnside had enough
political currency to have landed back in
corps command, and to be immune to
Meade's orders. He would report directly to
Grant, in awkward contravention of the
most basic principles of unity of command.
The combined Federal force that crossed
the Rapidan at the beginning of May
numbered about 120,000 men. Lee could
counter with only a few more than half as
many troops, including Longstreet's infantry,
newly returned from their adventures (and
mis-adventures) in Tennessee and Georgia.
Grant could - and did - draw on
innumerable reinforcements through the
coming campaign; the Confederate
manpower cupboard by this time had
become close to bare.
Grant intended to move south across the
Rapidan east of Lee's army and slice straight
through 'the Wilderness' to get between his
enemy and Richmond. That would force Lee
to react rapidly under circumstances in
which his enemy could choose the terms of
engagement. Much late-twentieth-century
writing has professed to recognize the
striking wisdom that places did not matter,
only the enemy's army. Lee and his
government knew better. Richmond must be
held for an array of fundamental reasons,
industrial, logistical, military, political, and
spiritual. When it in fact fell in April 1865,
the war in Virginia ended almost
concurrently. Grant's attempt to force Lee's
small army to defend the approaches to
Richmond in the spring of 1864 was
precisely the right formula.
Getting through the Wilderness proved to
be far more difficult than Grant had hoped.
The dense second-growth thickets that gave
the region its name covered about 70 square
miles (180km^2 ) on the south bank of the
Rapidan-Rappahannock line, about
12 miles (19km) wide and six miles (9.5km)
deep. When Lee received word that his
adversary had crossed the Rapidan into the
Wilderness, he hurled his troops eastward
and they struck the Federal right flank like a