The American Civil War - This Mighty Scourge of War

The fighting 215

Although Federals outnumbered him by three-to-one,

Confederate General Jubal A. Early put up a stout

resistance in the northern Shenandoah valley in the

autumn of 1864. In the Battles of Third Winchester

(19 September), Fisher's Hill (22 September) and Cedar

Creek (19 October), the Federals suffered considerably

more casualties than they inflicted on their Southern

foes - but they could afford the losses and Early

could not. After Cedar Creek, Confederate presence in

the once-fertile valley consisted of little more than

a nuisance force of cavalry and irregular troops.

line outside Washington and came under
desultory long-range fire. The Confederates
did not get into the capital city proper, and
could not have held it had they done so. As
Jubal Early commented in summary: 'We
haven't taken Washington, but we've scared
Abe Lincoln like hell!'
Union forces pursued Early to the Potomac
river as he retired, then to the slopes of the
Blue Ridge, and then beyond to the
Shenandoah river. Early's rearguard repulsed
them along the way, then savagely turned on
the Federals at Kernstown on 24 July, just
south of Winchester. There the Confederates
inflicted one of the most unmitigated
thrashings of the war on their enemies, who
suffered more than 1,200 casualties as against
fewer than 250 Confederates lost. A few days
later, General Grant sent a new commander
to the Shenandoah valley, with strong
reinforcements. His instructions to General
Philip H. Sheridan were to whip Early, and
then to turn the beautiful valley into 'a
barren waste.'
Despite an enormous preponderance in
numbers, Sheridan had a far easier time
accomplishing the 'barren waste' element of
his orders than he did in whipping Early. In
the decisive battles of September and
October, Sheridan was able to deploy more
cavalry than Early had troops of all arms
combined. Those cavalry, furthermore,
enjoyed wide mobility on good horses,
and carried weapons that dramatically
out-performed the equipment available to
the Southern horsemen. Early did not trust
his cavalry. He had more than ample cause
for queasiness, but his fractious relationship
with the mounted arm only exacerbated a

deadly situation. In postwar quarreling with

General Thomas L. Rosser, his chief cavalry

subordinate during the campaign, Early

referred to Rosser as 'a consummate ass,'

compared him to Judas Iscariot, and

suggested that if Rosser were to emulate

Judas and hang himself, it would be 'the

most creditable act' he could perform.

For more than six weeks, Sheridan

followed Early's detachments hither and

yon through the northern valley as the

Confederates tore up the Baltimore and Ohio

Railroad - a vital Federal artery - and feinted

The Shenandoah Valley Campaign,

September-October 1864