The fighting 2 53Rosecrans may have been slow, but he was
not without skills. He used a portion of his
army to swing around and threaten the
Confederate rear. In an effort to protect the
Confederate base at Tullahoma, Bragg pulled
his forces back, thereby uncovering valuable
gaps in the Cumberland Plateau. With
powerful Union columns pressing through
them and then in on his flanks, and a raid that
threatened his rear, Bragg decided to abandon
Tullahoma and fall back to Chattanooga.
At comparatively little cost, Rosecrans had
driven his enemy back 80 miles (129km). But
he deemed further pursuit impossible. Heavy
rains had impaired movements on both sides,
converting roads into muck. 'Tulla,' so noted
one Confederate officer, was Greek for 'mud,'
and 'noma' meant 'more mud.' The halt,
however, did not sit well with authorities in
Washington. They could neither see rainfall
nor experience the mud; all they could
envision was a delay that would allow Bragg
to fortify. And when Old Rosy took time to
repair the railroad from Nashville, they
interpreted it as his usual temporizing
behavior and balked. Finally, under threat of
removal, Rosecrans's army rumbled forward
again in mid-August 1863, in conjunction
with Burnside's advance on Knoxville.
Bragg, meanwhile, had lost the faith of
his army and had begun to lose confidence
in himself. His corps commanders, Polk and
Lieutenant-General William J. Hardee, had
voiced displeasure over his leadership. For
the most part. Bragg's soldiers despised him
for his strict discipline and lack of battlefield
success. Under stress, especially during
campaigns, he himself grew ever more
despondent. Rather than view the mountains
After fighting at luka and Corinth, Rosecrans assumed
command of the Army of the Cumberland. He led the
army at the bloody engagement at Stones River. He
directed the army skillfully in theTullahoma campaign, but
suffered a disaster at Chickamauga when he pulled troops
from his line based on an erroneous report. Rebels
attacked through the opening and routed his army.
Grant replaced him with Thomas. Rosecrans finished
out the war as head of the Department of Missouri.
(Library of Congress)
around Chattanooga as a defensive
advantage, Bragg transformed them in his
own mind into a Federal asset.
Because those mountains and the
Tennessee River provided strong protection
for Chattanooga and its defenders, Rosecrans
executed a march of deception, as he had
done in the Tullahoma campaign. He sent a
portion of his army north of the city, to
convey the impression that he was uniting
with Burnside. The bulk of his army, though,
crossed the Tennessee River to the southwest.
By the time Bragg realized what had
happened, Union forces were barreling down
on his rear. On 8 September, he abandoned
Chattanooga to the Federals.
To this point, in spite of delays, Rosecrans
had conducted a skillful campaign. But then
he got sloppy. He assumed the Rebels would
fall back once again, and he divided his
army for another maneuver campaign,
spreading it out far too wide for the hilly
terrain. Fortunately for Old Rosy, Bragg could
not exploit the opportunity. Twice the Rebel
commander tried to pounce on portions of
Rosecrans's isolated forces, and in both
instances subordinates failed to execute. In