276 The American Civil Wareven grander campaign. He proposed that he
send a portion of his army back to Tennessee
under Thomas, in case Hood pushed farther
north, while he struck west for Savannah
with 65,000 men.
Neither Lincoln nor Halleck liked the
plan, and Grant was at best lukewarm. The
commanding general much preferred that
Sherman eliminate Hood's army first. But
Sherman kept tossing out more and more
reasons why he should go and, ultimately, he
struck a responsive chord. 'Instead of being
on the defensive, I would be on the
offensive,' he reminded his friend, 'instead of
guessing at what he means to do, he would
have to guess at my plans. The difference in
war is full 25 per cent.' From that moment.
Grant blocked any challenges to Sherman's
raid, even though he raised questions
himself. Grant believed in Sherman.
For his campaign. Sherman retained four
corps - the XV and XVII from the Army of
Tennessee and the XIV and XX from the
Army of the Cumberland - totaling about
60,000 infantry and artillery, along with a
cavalry division of 5,000. These he grouped
into two armies, the Army of the Tennessee
under Howard and the Army of Georgia
under Major-General Henry W. Slocum. To
Chattanooga or Nashville under Thomas,
Sherman sent back two corps, the IV and
the X, plus some cavalry. Schofield elected to
go with Thomas.
Even though Confederate scouts detected
the passage of troops and supplies back and
forth. Hood decided not to try to block
Sherman's advance deeper into Georgia. The
Confederate commander had come to the
conclusion that he could inflict more damage
on the Federal war effort by invading
Tennessee and possibly Kentucky without
Sherman's army hounding his rear than by
chancing a battle with the larger Federal
force. Although Hood still had doubts about
his army defeating superior numbers in a
pitched battle, he was fully confident in its
ability to conduct an effective raid against
the smaller Federal numbers to the north.
Thus, in an anomaly of warfare, both the
Federals and the Confederates terminated the
campaign intentionally by marching in
opposite directions from one another without
having given battle.The March to the Sea
On 12 November 1864. in preparation for
the campaign, Sherman's troops began to
destroy anything of military value 60 miles
(96km) back from Atlanta. Some private
homes along the railroad were also torched.
In Atlanta.-Sherman's soldiers overstepped
their bounds, lighting fires throughout the
town and damaging an estimated
4,000-5,000 structures. Fortunately, the
population in Atlanta was light. After seizing
the city, Sherman had shipped out some of
the inhabitants. He saw no need to strain his
food supplies for Rebel supporters.
Sherman took about 1.2 million rations
with his army and a couple of weeks'
worth of fodder for his animals. He had
studied census records before the campaign
and determined that he could supply his
army from the people of Georgia, as long as
his army kept moving. The key to the
campaign was his reliance on the
experienced nature of his soldiers. Eighty
percent of his enlisted men had joined the
army in 1861 or 1862. Nearly 50 percent
qualified as veteran volunteers, having
re-enlisted for a second term of service. They
knew how to handle themselves on the
march, on the battlefield, and in camp. To
feed his army, Sherman would have to
disperse foragers into the countryside, often
with loose supervision, and here that
experience proved critical.
Against his army of 65,000, for much of
the campaign the Confederates could only
muster Major-General Joseph Wheeler and
his 3,500 cavalrymen and some militia. On
the march, Sherman intended to interpose
his army between two valuable military
targets. The Confederates could either
protect one or divide their forces, weakening
resistance more. Thus, Sherman positioned
his army between Macon and Augusta, two
valuable industrial sites. Sherman realized