7 4 The American Civil WarMajor-General Joseph Hooker, who predicted victory
but refused to shoulder responsibility when his plans
went awry. A Union artillerist heard Hooker try to
shift blame for the defeat at Chancellorsville to
6th Corps commander John Sedgwick. 'My feelings
were divided between shame for my commanding
general,' remarked the artillerist in late May 1863.
'and indignation at the attack on so true, brave, and
modest a man as Sedgwick.' (Author's collection)
and North Carolina. Scarcely more than
60,000 Confederates of all arms prepared to
defend the Rappahannock river lines. Yet
most Confederates expected victory. They
enjoyed superior generalship in the team of
Lee and Jackson, who had forged remarkable
bonds with their men and had an impressive
record of victory. Dashing James Ewell
Brown ('Jeb') Stuart supplied equally able
leadership to the cavalry. The Army of
Northern Virginia had often overcome
intimidating odds to win victories, and its
men believed their commanders would
enable them to do so again. Stephen Dodson
Ramseur, a youthful brigadier-general in
Jackson's corps, reflected the army's
confidence. The 'vandal hordes of the
Northern Tyrant are struck down with terror
arising from their past experience,' he stated.
'They have learned to their sorrow that this
army is made up of veterans equal to those
of the "Old Guard" of Napoleon.'
Battle of Chancellorsville
The strategic initiative rested with Hooker,
who developed an impressive plan. He
proposed holding Lee's attention at
Fredericksburg with about 40,000 men under
John Sedgwick, while several corps made a
rapid march up the Rappahannock to turn
the rebel left and get in Lee's rear. Most of
the army's cavalry would ride towards
Richmond, cutting Lee's lines of
communication with the Confederate
capital. The turning column would have to
move through an area south of the
Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers known as
the Wilderness of Spotsylvania,
approximately 70 square miles (180 square
kilometres) of scrub woods and tangled
undergrowth that would retard effective
deployment of Hooker's superior manpower
and artillery. Once in Lee's rear, a fast march
towards Fredericksburg would take the
Federals out of the Wilderness into open
ground, where their numbers would tell. If
all went well, Lee's army would be trapped
between the flanking column and Sedgwick's
force at Fredericksburg.
The campaign began brilliantly for the
Federals. On 27 April 1863, Hooker's turning
column swung up the Rappahannock,
negotiated fords over that river and the
Rapidan, and by early afternoon on the
30th reached the crossroads of
Chancellorsville some 10 miles (16km) west of
Fredericksburg. George G. Meade, who led the
Union V Corps on the flanking maneuver,
expressed unabashed enthusiasm at what
Hooker had accomplished. 'This is splendid,'
he said, 'hurrah for old Joe; we are on Lee's
flank, and he does not know it.' A march of
2 or 3 miles (about 4km) would take the
Federals from Chancellorsville. which lay in
the Wilderness, to clear ground farther east.
But Hooker ordered the troops to remain at
Chancellorsville, where he joined them that
evening. The Federal commander announced
to his army that 'our enemy must either
ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his
defenses and give us battle on our own
ground, where certain destruction awaits him.'