Is winning everything?
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In 2010 the state of California cut funding for the
University of California at Berkeley by several hundred
million dollars, raised student fees 10 percent, and
forced faculty and staff to take unpaid furloughs.
Despite this, the university covered the nearly $6.4 mil-
lion deficit generated by its intercollegiate athletics pro-
gram. Campus supporters of the football program noted
that two-thirds of the top NCAA football teams ran even
larger deficits; the average was about $8 million.
Although some of Berkeley’s faculty endorsed an“Academics First” petition, others applauded the chan-
cellor’s decision to pursue “competitive excellence” in
all aspects of campus life. Berkeley’s football team was
mandated to compete “at the top levels of the Pacific
Ten conference and in postseason and national cham-
pionship play.” To that end, Berkeley paid its head
coach $1.5 million, about average for a Division I
head coach.
This insistence on winning intercollegiate football
originated in the late nineteenth century. At that time, a
few colleges decided to pay coaches, recruited star prep
school athletes, and charged spectators to watch the
games. The game became faster and rougher. Soon the
spectacle attracted huge audiences. Action often got out