one Democratic senator. “I shall
consent to nothing. The Senate
must take its medicine.” Thus
the stage was set for a monumen-
tal test of strength between the
president and the Republican
majority in the Senate.
Partisanship, principle, and
prejudice clashed mightily in this
contest. A presidential election
loomed. Should the League prove a
success, the Republicans wanted to
be able to claim a share of the
credit, but Wilson had refused to
allow them to participate in drafting
the document. This predisposed all
of them to favor changes. Politics
aside, genuine alarm at the possible
sacrifice of American sovereignty to
an international authority led many
Republicans to urge modification
of the League covenant, or consti-
tution. Personal dislike of Wilson
and his high-handed methods
motivated others. Yet the noble
purpose of the League made many
reluctant to reject it entirely. The
intense desire of the people to have
an end to the long war made
Republican leaders hesitate before voting down the
Versailles Treaty, and they could not reject the League
without rejecting the treaty.
Wilson could count on the Democratic senators
almost to a man, but he had to win over many
Republicans to obtain the two-thirds majority neces-
sary for ratification. Republican opinion divided
roughly into three segments. At one extreme were
some dozen “irreconcilables,” led by the shaggy-
browed William E. Borah of Idaho, an able and
kindly person of progressive leanings but an uncom-
promising isolationist. Borah claimed that he would
vote against the League even if Jesus Christ returned
to earth to argue in its behalf, and most of his follow-
ers were equally inflexible. At the other extreme stood
another dozen “mild” reservationists who were in
favor of the League but who hoped to alter it in
minor ways, chiefly for political purposes. In the mid-
dle were the “strong” reservationists, senators willing
to go along with the League only if American sover-
eignty were fully protected and if it were made clear
that their party had played a major role in fashioning
the final document.
Senator Lodge, the leader of the Republican
opposition, was a haughty, rather cynical, intensely
partisan individual. He possessed a keen intelligence,632 Chapter 23 Woodrow Wilson and the Great War
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aDismantling the Ottoman Empire, 1919–1920The Ottoman Empire was the biggest loser at
Versailles: It lost everything apart from Turkey itself; but the Arab nationalists lost as well,
because Britain and France, through League-appointed mandates, took control of Syria,
Transjordan, Palestine, and Mesopotamia (Iraq).
The Senate Rejects the League of Nations
When Wilson returned from France, he finally
directed his attention to the task of winning public
approval of his handiwork. A large majority of the
people probably favored the League of Nations in
principle, though few understood all its implications
or were entirely happy with every detail. Wilson had
persuaded the Allies to accept certain changes in the
original draft to mollify American opposition. No
nation could be forced to accept a colonial mandate,
and “domestic questions” such as tariffs, the control
of immigration, and the Monroe Doctrine were
excluded from League control.
Many senators found these modifications insuf-
ficient. Even before the peace conference ended,
thirty-seven Republican senators signed a mani-
festo, devised by Henry Cabot Lodge of
Massachusetts, opposing Wilson’s League and
demanding that the question of an international
organization be put off until “the urgent business
of negotiating peace terms with Germany” had
been completed. Wilson rejected this suggestion
icily. Further alterations were out of the question.
“Anyone who opposes me... I’ll crush!” he told