740 Chapter 28 Collision Courses, Abroad and at Home: 1946–1960
in Moscow, thought that ideology was more symptom
than cause. Marxism, he wrote, provided the intellec-
tual “fig-leaf of morality and respectability” for naked
Soviet aggression. In an influential article, “The
Sources of Soviet Conduct,” published anonymously
in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs, Kennan
argued that the instability and illegitimacy of the Soviet
regime generated explosive internal pressures. These
forces, vented outward, would cause the Soviet Union
to expand “constantly, wherever it is permitted to
move” until it filled “every nook and cranny available
to it in the basin of world power.” A policy of “long-
term, patient but firm and vigilant containment” was
the best means of dealing with the Soviet Union.
“The Sources of Soviet Conduct” was powerfully
argued, but the article was ambiguous and imprecise
in crucial aspects. Exactly how the Soviets were to be
“contained” and the parts of the world to which the
policy should be applied were not spelled out. At the
outset containment was less a plan of action than a
plea for the resolve to act.
The Atom Bomb: A “Winning” Weapon?
Although Truman authorized use of the atom bomb
to force the surrender of Japan, he had hoped that a
demonstration of the weapon’s power also would
inhibit Stalin and serve as a counterweight to the Red
Army. Stalin, however, refused to be intimidated.
“Atomic bombs are meant to frighten those with
weak nerves,” he told his advisers. His resolve had
been stiffened as a result of Soviet espionage. Stalin
knew that the American atomic arsenal—slightly more
than a dozen bombs in 1947—was insufficient to
destroy the Soviet Union’s military machine.
The atomic bomb was a doubtful deterrent for
another reason. Sobering accounts of the devastation
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the suffering of the
victims of radiation poisoning left many Americans
uneasy. J. Robert Oppenheimer, director of the atom
bomb design team, informed government officials
that most scientists in the Manhattan Project would
not continue such work. “I feel we have blood on our
hands,” he told President Truman. “Never mind,”
Truman snapped. “It’ll all come out in the wash.” Yet
even Truman came to doubt whether the American
people would again “permit” their president to use
atomic weapons for aggressive purposes.
In November 1945 the United States suggested
that the UN supervise all nuclear energy production,
and the General Assembly created an Atomic Energy
Commission to study the question. In June 1946
Commissioner Bernard Baruch offered a plan for the
eventual outlawing of atomic weapons. Under thisA propaganda poster enshrining Stalin proclaims that he has led his people “Forward to Communism!”