Hot War in Korea 745already ordered development of the hydrogen
bomb.) On January 31, 1950, Truman publicly
announced that “though none wants to use it” he
had no choice but to proceed with a hydrogen bomb.
In Asia the effort to contain communism in China
had failed utterly. After World War II, Nationalists
under Chiang Kai-shek (sometimes spelled Jiang
Jieshi) dominated the south; communists under Mao
Zedong controlled much of the north. Truman tried
to bring Chiang’s Nationalists and Mao’s communists
together. He sent General Marshall to China to seek a
settlement, but neither Chiang nor Mao would make
significant concessions. In January 1947 Truman
recalled Marshall and named him secretary of state.
Soon thereafter civil war, suspended during the
Japanese occupation, erupted in China.
By the end of 1949 communist armies had admin-
istered a crushing defeat to the nationalists. The rem-
nants of Chiang Kai-shek’s forces fled to the island of
Formosa, now called Taiwan. Mao ruled China. The
“loss” of China to communism strengthened right-
wing elements in the Republican party. They charged
that Truman had not backed the Nationalists strongly
enough and that he had stupidly underestimated
Mao’s dedication to the cause of world revolution.
Despite a superficial plausibility, neither charge
made much sense. American opinion would not have
supported military intervention, and such interven-
tion unquestionably would have alienated the
Chinese people. That anyAmerican action could have
changed the outcome in China is unlikely. The
United States probably gave the Nationalists too
much aid rather than too little.
Containment had relied on American money,
materials, and know-how, but not on American sol-
diers. In early 1950, Truman proposed to pare the
budget by further reducing the nation’s armed forces.
Truman also called for a thorough review of the con-
cept of containment. Dean Acheson, who recently had
succeeded George Marshall as secretary of state, super-
vised the study. In March, it was submitted to the
National Security Council, assigned a numerical desig-
nation (NSC-68), classified top secret, and sent to the
nation’s military and diplomatic leaders for review.
NSC-68called for an enormous military expan-
sion. The Soviet Union, it declared, was engaged in a
worldwide assault on freedom: “A defeat of free insti-
tutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere.” Instead of
relying on other nations, the United States itself must
develop sufficient military forces to stop communism
from spreading anywhere in the world. Military spend-
ing therefore had to be increased from $14 billion to
nearly $50 billion. If the Soviet Union failed to keep
up with the American expenditures, it would no
longer pose a military threat, and if it attempted to
match the high levels of American military spending,
its less efficient economic system would collapse from
the strain.
The document was submitted to Truman on
April 7, 1950. He had planned significant cuts to
the defense budget; the prospect of increasing it by
350 percent appalled him. Within a few months,
however, events in Korea changed his mind.Hot War in Korea
After World War II the province of Korea was taken
from Japan and divided at 38° north latitude into the
Democratic People’s Republic in the north, backed
by the Soviet Union, and the Republic of Korea in the
south, backed by the United States and the UN. Both
powers withdrew their troops from the peninsula. The
Soviets left behind a well-armed local force, but the
Republic of Korea’s army was small and ill-trained.
American strategists, while seeking to “contain”
communism in East Asia, had decided that military
involvement on the Asian mainland made little sense.
America’s first line of defense was to be its island
bases in Japan and the Philippines. In a speech in
January 1950 Acheson deliberately excluded Korea
from what he described as the “defensive perimeter”
of the United States in Asia. It was up to the South
Koreans, backed by the UN, to protect themselves,
Acheson said. This encouraged the North Koreans to
attack. In June 1950, when their armored divisions,
led by 150 Soviet-made tanks, rumbled across the
thirty-eighth parallel, the South Koreans failed to
stop them.
Truman was at his family home in Independence,
Missouri, when Acheson telephoned with the news of
the North Korean attack. “Dean,” Truman explained,
“we’ve got to stop the sons of bitches no matter what.”
Truman hastened to Washington. On the flight, he
recalled how the communists in Korea were acting “just
as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fif-
teen, and twenty years earlier.” “If this were allowed to
go unchallenged,” he concluded, “it would mean a
third world war, just as similar incidents had brought
on the Second World War.” With the backing of the
UN Security Council (but without asking Congress to
declare war), he sent American planes into battle.^2
Ground troops soon followed. Truman also ordered
the adoption of NSC-68 “as soon as feasible.”(^2) The Soviet Union, which could have vetoed this action, was at the
moment boycotting the Security Council because the UN had
refused to give the Mao Zedong regime China’s seat on that body.