Dwight D. Eisenhower 749infamy so black as to dwarf any previous venture in
the history of man.”
McCarthy was totally unscrupulous. The “big
lie” was his most effective weapon: The enormity of
his charges and the status of his targets convinced
thousands that there must be some truth in what he
was saying. Nevertheless, his crude tactics would have
failed if the public had not been so worried about
communism. The worries were caused by the reality
of Soviet military power, the attack on Korea, the loss
of the nuclear monopoly, and the stories about spies,
some of them true.
McCarthy,Wheeling, West Virginia, Speech
atwww.myhistorylab.com
Dwight D. Eisenhower
As the 1952 presidential election approached,
Truman’s popularity was again at low ebb; he chose
not to seek reelection. In choosing their candidate,
the Republicans passed over the twice-defeated
Dewey and their most prominent leader, Senator
Robert A. Taft of Ohio, an outspoken conservative,
and nominated General Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Eisenhower’s popularity did not grow merely out
of his achievements in World War II. Although a West
Pointer (class of 1915), he struck most persons as
anything but warlike. After the bristly, combative
Truman, his genial personality and evident desire to
avoid controversy proved widely appealing. In his
reluctance to seek political office, Eisenhower
reminded the country of George Washington,
whereas his seeming ignorance of current political
issues was no more a handicap to his campaign than
the similar ignorance of Jackson and Grant in their
times. People “liked Ike” because his management of
the Allied armies suggested that he would be equally
competent as head of the complex federal govern-
ment. Eisenhower’s campaign was also the first to use
television effectively. It featured what came to be
known as “spots,” twenty-second tapes of candidate
Eisenhower responding to questions about his opin-
ions on issues, important and trivial. Eisenhower’s
promise during the campaign to go to Korea if
elected to try to bring the war to an end was a politi-
cal masterstroke.
The Democrats nominated Governor Adlai E.
Stevenson of Illinois, whose grandfather had been vice
president under Grover Cleveland. Stevenson’s unpre-
tentiousness was appealing, and his witty, urbane
speeches captivated intellectuals. In retrospect, how-
ever, it is clear that he had not the remotest chance of
defeating the popular Eisenhower.
The result was a Republican landslide: Eisenhower
received almost 34 million votes to Stevenson’s
ReadtheDocument27 million, and in the Electoral College his margin was
442 to 89.
On the surface, Eisenhower seemed the antithesis
of Truman. The Republicans had charged the
Democratic administration with being wasteful and
extravagant, and Eisenhower planned to run his
administration on sound business principles. He
spoke scornfully of “creeping socialism,” called for
more local control of government affairs, and
promised to reduce federal spending to balance the
budget and cut taxes. He believed that by battling
with Congress and pressure groups over the details of
legislation, his immediate predecessors had sacrificed
part of their status as chief representative of the
American people. Like Washington, he tried to avoid
being caught up in narrow partisan conflicts. But like
Washington, he was not always able to do so.
Eisenhower’s somewhat doctrinaire belief in
decentralization and private enterprise reduced theMany critics lampooned Eisenhower for his banal amusements. A
popular bumper sticker read: “BEN HOGAN [a famous golfer] FOR
PRESIDENT. IF WE’RE GOING TO HAVE A GOLFER FOR PRESIDENT,
LET’S HAVE A GOOD ONE.” Others have viewed Eisenhower’s
passion for golf as characteristic of his presidential style: methodical,
prudent, and, when in the rough, disarmingly shrewd.